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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the relationship between foreign aid and economic development in sub 
Saharan Africa. The study seeks to examine the role of institutions in aid effectiveness and 
economic development in Sub Saharan Africa. The study adopted a theoretical framework 
similar to the Endogenous or New Growth model, as well as; the system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) technique of estimation was adopted in order to overcome the challenge of 
endogeneity perceived in the institutions variables and Aid growth argument. It was observed 
that foreign aid significantly influence Real GDP Per Capita (the proxy for economic 
development) in Sub Saharan Africa. Also, variables like gross fixed capital formation, rule of 
law, control of corruption (which are proxy for institutions) and Human capital had a significant 
effect on Economic development in sub Saharan Africa while labour had no significant effect on 
economic development in Sub Saharan Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background To Study 
Most African countries are characterized by massive poverty, high death rate, slow GDP growth, 
high population growth rate and increased income inequality, increased absolute poverty rate, 
low educational standards, low human development index to mention a few. According to 
development statistics, in Africa, about 1.2 billion people live on less than $1 a day and another 
2.8 billion people live on less than $2 a day. This is also a similar case in health as the mortality 
rate has sky rocketed over the years as declared according to the UNICEF who stated that more 
than 10 million children die each year from preventable disease such as malaria, polio to mention 
a few (Emmanuel, 2012; Ogundipe and Ogundipe, 2013). Another scenario in developing 
countries is that the child mortality rate remains more than 10 times higher than those found in 
the rich countries and this is as a result of diseases that can be treated easily like dehydration 
(Todaro and Smith, 2011). 
 In examining human capital development via education, Africa is in deteriorating conditions. 
The average child in sub Saharan Africa can expect to spend less than 5 years in school, without 
even considering absenteeism of teachers and lack of resources like books. This is in deep 
contrast with a child in Europe who is sure to get at least 12 years of schooling. Also, the 
education gender gap is especially great in developing countries in Africa, where female literacy 
rates can be less than half of men’s in countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Benin to mention 
a few. Sub Saharan Africa and even Africa as a whole have been seen to exhibit relatively low 
levels of income despite the fact that they are heavily populated. Sub Saharan Africa received 
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just two percent of total shares of Global income in the year 2008. According to Todaro (2011), 
In the case of income inequality and absolute poverty which is a major topic in development 
economics, the incidence of extreme poverty is very high as released by the World Bank’s 
estimate that the share of the population living on less than $1.25 per day is 41.1% in sub 
Saharan Africa. Population growth rate of developing countries especially in Africa continue to 
grow in leaps and bounds. From 1990 to 2008, population in the low income countries grew at an 
average of 2.2% per year. The main issue is that there has been a case of heavy debt servicing 
and it has been observed that most funds in Africa go into servicing debts. (Todaro and Smith, 
2011) 
Also, literature reviews have shown that during the 80s, averagely, in sub Saharan Africa, per 
capita income fell at an annual rate of 2.2 percent. According to Bakare (2011), Per capita 
private consumption also dropped by 14.8 percent, import volume rose at an annual rate of 4.3 
percent with export volume remaining constant with terms of trade falling by 9.1 percent. Given 
the high population growth rate, annual real GDP per capita growth rate between 1981 and 1990 
was –0.9% which was contrary to East Asia’s performance of GDP per capita growth rate of 
6.3% during that period. Still the economic performance of Sub Saharan Africa did not improve 
in the early 90s as confirmed that between 1991 and 1993, real per capita GDP was 2.3% 
annually. In 1994, it still remained negative at -0.7%. Luckily, in 1995, this became positive 
reaching 1.1% which was still lower than the 8.0% growth rate testified by East Asia. The World 
Bank classified 74% of the countries of SSA as low income economies while the United Nations 
Development Programme classified 79% of SSA as low human development countries. Lastly, 
according to World bank (1998), out of the 41 countries in the world classified as heavily 
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indebted countries by the World Bank and international monetary fund, 80% are in sub Saharan 
Africa (SSA) ( Bakare A.S, 2011). 
From the above illustrations, it has been obvious that Africa (more specifically, sub Saharan 
Africa) cannot develop on their own and they need all the help they can get. As a result, foreign 
aid comes to foreplay. Foreign aid can be defined as all resources- physical goods, skills, 
technical know-how, financial grants, or loans (at concessional rates) transferred by donors to 
recipients (Riddell 2007). According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD), foreign aid is defined as 
official development assistance (ODA). According to DAC, aid qualifies as ODA on three 
criteria: 
1) It has to be undertaken by official agencies and flows have to go to developing country 
government 
2) It has to have the promotion of economic development and welfare as its main objective, 
thus excluding military aid and private investment 
3) It has to have a grant element of twenty five percent or more at a ten percent discount rate 
It was stated in some economic theories that capital formation was the basic problem of 
developing countries with Africa being one of them and so aid is important as it play a vital role 
in capital formation which is essential for economic growth. The objectives of foreign aid have 
been to end extreme world poverty, increase savings and investment and achieve development in 
developing economies (Eroglu and Yavuz) and this is exactly what Africa needs. According to 
literature reviews, foreign aid is deemed important to the development of Africa as it is a means 
of increasing capital for economic growth and investment, reducing poverty and raising the 
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standard of living of persons, contributing to the transfer of skills, technologies and production 
methods, increasing product diversity and generates employment (OECD-DAC 1999),( Bakare, 
2011) 
Morrissey (2001) also stated that there were a number of mechanisms through which aid can 
contribute to economic growth including: 
1) Aid increases investment in physical and human capital 
2) Aid increases the capacity to import capital goods or technology 
3) Aid does not have indirect effect that reduces investment or savings rate 
4) Aid is associated with technology transfer that increases the productivity of capital and 
promotes endogenous technical change. 
It is therefore ironical to note that despite the fact that ODA has been pumped into Africa mostly 
into sub Saharan Africa yet there is no evidence of real economic development or if there has 
been as some economic researchers claim, there is small impact compared to the whole which 
can be described as the micro-macro paradox (Paul Mosley, 1987 as cited in Aid, Growth, 
Development, Channing Ardnt, et al). Instead there has been slow economic growth, high levels 
of unemployment, absolute poverty, low GDP per capita levels, etc to mention a few. 
According to OECD (2009b), in 2008, total net ODA from members of DAC rose by 10.2 
percent in real terms to US$119.8 billion and were expected to rise in 2010 by US$130 billion. 
Africa is the largest recipient of foreign aid. This can be illustrated according to the example 
given by Ekanayake and Chatrna: net bilateral ODA from DAC donors to Africa in 2008 was a 
total sum of US$26 billion, of which US$22.5 billion went to sub Saharan Africa. Bilateral aid 
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(excluding volatile debt relief grant) to Africa and Sub Saharan Africa rose by 10.6 percent and 
10 percent respectively in real terms. 
According to MC Gillivray, et al. (2006), there are four main views on the effectiveness of aid: 
aid has decreasing returns, aid effectiveness is limited by external and climatic conditions, aid 
effectiveness is influenced by political conditions and aid effectiveness depends on institutional 
quality. The question on the role of institutions have come up in debates on economic 
development and is fast gaining grounds as Aid has been said to be more effective in high quality 
public institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
The World Bank reports in 2004 showed that there has been a reduction in the amount of foreign 
aid directed to developing countries on this measure, rich countries reduced their aid 
contributions from around 0.34% to 0.23% of their output between 1990 and 2002. The reason 
for this can be attributed to several reasons ranging from economic to political changes (Hopkins 
2000, Robinson and trap 2000.). However, the main reason for this “aid-fatigue” can be 
attributed to the fact that aid has failed to some large extents as there have been reports of 
corruption and poor administration, with aid management tying up valuable resources in 
recipient countries (Kanbur, 2000). Some researchers have argued that a large portion of foreign 
aid flowing into the country is wasted on unproductive public consumption, corruption and 
inefficiencies and this is as a result of poor institutional quality and bad governance. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Without a speck of doubt, it is seen that foreign aid has failed in Africa and sub Saharan Africa 
and this has been fully backed up by statistics. Despite the different forms of aid, most especially 
the ODA, sub Saharan Africa has not progressed to a meaningful stage of development. As home 
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to a large proportion of the world’s “bottom billion,” Sub-Saharan Africa has attracted 
substantial amounts of foreign aid over the years. ODA flows to the continent currently stand at 
around $80 billion per annum and the figure is projected to reach $125 billion by 2010. Over the 
last five decades, foreign aid to governments in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to $1 trillion. 
Ironically, at the same time period, growth of GDP per capita in Africa actually registered a 
marked decline and was for many years even negative.GDP per capita figures also declined 
across most of Sub- Saharan Africa asides a few countries. For example, World Bank 
calculations show that based on the predictions of theories, foreign aid transfers to Zambia, 
which began in the 1960s, would have by today pushed per-capita income to over $20,000. 
However, reverse is the case as Zambian income per capita has stagnated at around $600 for 
years (Farah Abuzeid). This provides a vivid illustration of the failures of foreign aid in sub 
Saharan Africa.  
Over the years, according to World Development Indicator (WDI) data, ODA as a percentage of 
total world’s ODA for Sub Saharan Africa has increased and yet economic growth rate has not 
increased. In 1980, 23.392% of total world ODA was pumped to SSA but the economic growth 
rate was just 1.135% in that year. The percentage increased to 28.577% in 1985 but economic 
growth rate declined to -1.157% in that same year depicting a negative growth rate. ODA further 
increased to 29.328% of total world percentage but there was still no positive growth rate as the 
economic growth rate still was at a negative of -1.565%. This is unlike the story of other 
countries on the table, say China whose total ODA as a percentage of the world’s total ODA was 
not as high as that of Sub Saharan Africa and yet her economic growth rate was higher than that 
of Sub Saharan Africa. In China, as the percentage of ODA (Official Development Assistance) 
increased from 0.190% in 1980 to 2.919% in 1985, economic growth rate increased from 
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approximately 6% in 1980 to 12% in 1985 thus showing that as ODA doubled in its rate, the 
economic growth rate also reciprocated by doubling too implying that foreign aid in form of 
official development assistance was effective in accomplishing growth. The irony is that in Sub 
Saharan Africa, when ODA reduced to 27.529% of total world percentage, economic growth rate 
became positive and grew to 1.091%. All these go further to interpret that the as the ODA 
pumped to Sub Saharan African Countries increased, economic growth rate declined. This shows 
that aid has not been very effective, at least in Sub Saharan Africa. 
 The topic of aid effectiveness has been a subject of debate to many economists and different 
reasons ranging from economic to social and even, political factors have been given as to the 
question of why aid has failed. The main or major reason accounted for has been attributed to 
poor institutional quality and bad governance. In fact, to show the importance of the role of 
institutions, Keefer end Knack, (1997) said that good governance in the form of institutions is 
crucial for sustained and rapid growth in per capita income of poor countries. Aid is thought to 
work best with high quality institution presumably as a part of a capable developmental state 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000, world bank 1998). According to Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), 
the deep determinants of a society might play a big role in aid effectiveness and this points to 
institutional quality. Therefore, we can conclude that institutions have an essential role to play 
especially in aid administration for economic development in Sub Saharan Africa. In other 
words, good institutions should lead to a well ordered society which would lead to the effective 
use of foreign aid. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
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The main objective of this research is to examine the relationship between aid and economic 
development in sub Saharan Africa. However, the other objectives will be listed in subsequent 
paragraphs below: 
1) To examine the effect of foreign aid in sub Saharan Africa countries 
2) To examine the Role of institutions the aid effectiveness. 
3) To explain the effect of institutions on economic development in sub Saharan Africa. 
1.4 Research Questions  
The research objectives stated earlier necessitated the need for the research questions. Therefore, 
the research questions that need to be analyzed and answered to are as follows: 
1) Does foreign aid have any significant relationship with economic development in sub 
Saharan Africa? 
2) Do institutions have a role to play in aid effectiveness in sub Saharan Africa? 
3) To what extent have institutions ensured economic development in sub Saharan Africa? 
1.5 Research Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: there is no significant relationship between foreign aid and economic development in sub 
Saharan Africa 
H1: there is a significant relationship between foreign aid and economic development in SSA. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: institutions would not help in ensuring aid effectiveness in sub Saharan Africa 
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H1: institutions would help in ensuring aid effectiveness in sub Saharan Africa. 
Hypothesis 3: 
H0: institutions have no significant effect on economic development in sub Saharan Africa. 
H1: institutions have a significant effect on economic development in sub Saharan Africa. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Economic development is crucial for any viable country. In fact, the importance or substance of 
a country is measured by her level of economic development. For developing countries, foreign 
aid has been seen as needed to promote economic development for such country. Sub Saharan 
Africa is seen as the highest ODA recipient in Africa but the countries within this region are 
characterized by very low per capita GDP and real GDP growth. Also, the country faces several 
challenges of political instability and institutional failure. As a result of these challenges, it is 
seen that foreign aid cannot be very effective in ensuring economic development. Moreover, 
most researches concentrate majorly on foreign aid and economic development without looking 
at the roles that institutions and policies play in the administration of foreign aid for economic 
development. 
Therefore, this study is aimed towards examining foreign aid and economic development as well 
as the role of institutions and how they impact foreign aid and economic development. This 
study is also significant in the sense that it would help to give policy recommendations on how 
foreign aid can be channeled effectively for economic development in sub Saharan Africa. 
1.7Justification of Study  
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The justification for choosing to concentrate on SSA and the specific countries to be included 
into the sample is based on the conclusions of past studies on aid effectiveness (Wako, 2011). 
There have been different conclusions on the subject matter. Easterly (2003, 2005) point out that 
aid has been most ineffective in SSA based on the success of Asia and Latin America. Others, 
who advocate the (unconditional or conditional) success of foreign aid have also accepted that it 
has been less effective in SSA (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1998). Other 
researchers like Riddell (1999) and Collier (2006) predict that the future playfield of aid is 
Africa. Kanbur (2000) also shares the idea that SSA is the region where the issues of aid and aid 
effectiveness remain unsettled yet 
1.8 Scope of Study 
To ensure proper representation of data, this study would be broadened to some selected 
countries in sub Saharan Africa base on the availability of data. The data gotten would cover a 
period of 15 years from 1996 to 2010. The data to be used in the course of this research would be 
gotten from world development indicators (WDI), Worldwide Governance indicators (WGI), 
OECD/DAC database. 
1.9 Limitations of Study  
The limitations in this research range from insufficient data to time constraint, scarcity of 
research facilities, transportation as well as inadequate funding of the research. Though these 
limitations did exist, they are not strong enough to invalidate this study and its findings. 
1.10 Research Methodology 
This study will involve empirical data analysis. The study will make use of the Generalised 
Method of Moments. The results obtained from data collected would help in achieving stated 
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objectives for the research. The underlying model for this study is the New Growth theory. 
Secondary data would be used in this study, particularly from World Development Indicator 
(WDI) data and from World Governance Indicator (WGI) data. The estimation period will cover 
1996 to 2010. 
 
1.11 Outline of Work 
For easy analysis and assessment of the project, the study is structured into five chapters. The 
introductory chapter which gives a general overview to the study is followed by chapter two. The 
chapter presents the review of relevant literatures with respect to the research topic and relates 
economic theories to the subject matter of foreign aid and economic development. The trends of 
foreign aid in sub Saharan Africa were considered as well as some empirical findings in the 
subject area. 
The third chapter focuses on the theoretical framework and research method. The Exogenous or 
New Growth model formed the basis for the inclusion of variables in the models. Chapter four 
constitutes empirical analysis- data presentation and statistical analysis using the Systems 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The results obtained were presented and interpreted in 
the same chapter. Lastly, chapter five presents the summary of the major findings in the research 
study, policy recommendations of findings, suggestions for further study, limitations of study 
and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Definitional Issues on Foreign Aid 
2.1 Concept of foreign aid. 
There are diverse definitions of foreign aid and this has constituted problems in defining foreign 
aid because not all kinds of non-commercial international financial flows can be conceptually 
included as foreign aid. The term foreign aid is generally used in the sense of flow of resources 
from the rich countries to the poor under developed countries At some point, ‘all real resource 
transfer’ from developed to underdeveloped or developing countries were included as foreign aid 
and this raised conceptual problems because it includes certain resource transfer which do not 
essentially qualify as foreign aid. The resource transfers are as follows: 
 (i)      Preferential tariffs granted by the developed to the less developed countries amounts to 
"disguised" resource transfer, but it does not qualify as foreign aid; 
(ii)     Flow of foreign private investment based also on non-commercial consideration should not 
be classified as foreign aid. 
17 
 
Capital flow from donors to recipients should have a non commercial motive from the viewpoint 
of the donor and it should involve concessions in interest rate and repayment terms. This 
definition is incomplete because it includes aid such as military aid, ad hoc financial support in 
case of natural calamities, and food aid in case of drought, and so on. According to Michael 
Todaro, The generally accepted and used definition of foreign aid is one that encompasses all 
official grants and concessional loans, in currency or in kind, that are broadly aimed at 
transferring resources from developed to less developed nations on development and income 
redistribution grounds."  
According to the United Nations, economic aid means outright grants and long term loans for 
non military purposes by Governments and various international organizations. According to 
Mikesall, foreign aid is defined as a transmission of real resource from one country to another 
that normally won’t take place as a result of the operation of market forces or in absence of 
specific official action put in place to promote such transfer from the donor country. Therefore 
foreign aid includes direct government transfers as well as those promoted by special official 
action such as government guarantees. 
Riddell (2007) also defined foreign aid as comprising all kinds of resources ranging from 
physical merchandise, skills and technical know-how, financial grants including gifts, and loans 
which are given to recipients by donors at concessional rates. The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
also defines aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) which qualifies on three criteria:  
1) it is to be undertaken by official agencies;  
2) it is to have the main objectives of promoting economic development and welfare  
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3) It has to have a grant element of twenty five percent or more. 
This study uses the DAC’s (Development Assistance Committee) definition of foreign aid. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Foreign Aid 
2.1.1 Advantages of Foreign Aid 
The main problems of developing countries according to the early growth theories which existed 
in the 1950s and the 1960s was capital formation and these theories were of the opinion that 
development assistance was greatly needed as capital formation had a very important role to play 
in economic growth and development. The reasons given for these arguments were that these 
developing countries have insufficient private and public savings to finance large investments 
such as the development of economic and social infrastructure. Also, developing countries have 
few resources to finance in the form of foreign exchange the importation of machinery and other 
capital goods. As such, foreign aid was needed to fill the savings-investment gaps and the trade 
gaps by increasing the level of investment and thus economic growth. From 1980, there have 
been different objectives of providing foreign aid with the expected returns in form of economic 
growth, investment, poverty reduction and public expenditure in terms of services in the 
developing countries. Foreign aid also in form of technical assistance provides technical skills 
which have a positive effect on development and this is done by improving human capital quality 
and filling the skills gap. 
Another advantage of foreign aid is that it helps the government to meets its development 
objectives by meeting up to her spending and expenses. Thus, foreign aid used for investment in 
education, health and other infrastructure contributes to economic growth and overall economic 
development. The programme aid which is also seen as import support helps to increase the 
production efficiency of both public and private enterprises which results into higher output and 
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increases the availability of goods and services. Also, foreign aid is known to be very essential 
for emergence reliefs in war devastated areas and areas affected by natural disasters such as 
flood, hurricanes, etc. Mostly, humanitarian aid has gone a long way to saving lives, provision of 
food to the poor and hungry, provision of free health care services to the sick and deprived, 
medicines for those vulnerable to diseases in emergencies (Conchesta, 2008). Lastly, foreign aid 
has helped in the settlements of debt overhangs in the developing countries and the remaining 
resources from debt cancellations can go a long way in performing some other functions of vital 
importance in such countries (Conchesta, 2008). 
2.1.2 Disadvantages of Foreign Aid 
Aid is seen to impose some negative effects also in the economy of developing countries. Project 
aid is noticed to distort spending patterns as aid recipient governments are supposed to cover the 
recurrent costs of project. Also the increase of numerous projects creates pressure to the already 
restricted capacity in developing countries. A study by Lane and Tornell suggests that in an 
economy with powerful groups but weak institutions, as is the case in many African countries, 
the heightened lobbying and rent-seeking activity that follows a resource windfall causes a more 
than proportional increase in redistribution. This aggressive effect will then yield a lower rate of 
return to the investment and a net social loss. According to Riddell (2007), Aid tying which is 
associated to project aid causes the exploitation of the developing countries because they are 
usually indebted to purchase items from the donor country. Foreign aid is also likely to lead to 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the developing countries and this result into rising 
domestic inflation. This is known to be the Dutch disease whereby an inflow of foreign exchange 
in form of export earnings, private capital inflows or foreign aid puts an upward pressure on the 
real exchange rate of the recipient developing country. Foreign aid may lead to the appreciation 
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of the exchange rate of the recipient country thereby reducing the competitiveness of the export 
sector.  
Debt extensions and overhang is also a major problem in the developing countries. Despite the 
Highly indebted Poor countries initiatives and other reforms, countries are still under huge debt 
burdens. This has been attributed to the very high interest rates paid on loans for which a large 
share of their budget is used to pay such debts. There is also the fungibility of aid in developing 
countries and this leads to a limited impact on growth and poverty reduction (Pack and Pack, 
1993).  Fungibility of aid refers to the notion that donors provide funding for projects that 
address specific needs in the country for which the recipient government has already reserved 
resources from its own budget. The inflow of foreign assistance makes it possible for the 
recipient government to reduce its own allocation of resources in the sector that receives the 
ODA, and to reallocate those resources elsewhere. Although the concept of fungibility itself is 
not necessarily harmful, especially if the extra funds are reallocated into productive uses within 
the economy, fungibility is problematic because it increases the possibility of corruption and 
rent-seeking. The fungibility effect makes it easier for corrupt officials to reallocate and conceal 
some of the “surplus” funding into wasteful expenditures and fraudulent or overinflated 
procurement costs because at the end of the day the initial announced objectives of these 
government funds are still met using the funds coming from foreign aid (Conchesta, 2008). Aid 
also creates a “moral hazard” problem in the recipient country by serving as a permanent soft 
budget constraint. The persistent influx of easy foreign aid money creates the impression that the 
recipient government would be bailed out when things go wrong Foreign aid also enables 
resources to be used for other purposes where the recipient government can use the local taxes 
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and other sources of income for military weapons, extended oppressions and luxury 
consumptions (Degnbol and Pedersen, 2003).  
2.1.3 Forms of Foreign Aid 
1) Project Aid 
Project aid is defined as resources allocated to specific set of activities which are well defined in 
terms of objectives, input and output. This kind of aid help in funding developing projects in 
different sectors of developing countries like the education, agriculture, health, power, transport 
sectors to mention a few because they are mainly in form of resources, skills and system which is 
very much needed. However, according to Conchesta (2008), this form of aid has reduced from 
the 1990s.  
2) Programme Aid  
Programme aid is defined by OECD as financial contributions not linked to specific activities (as 
cited in Riddell 2007). Programme aid is a financial assistance targeted particularly to fund 
imports, a programme of support for a sector or discrete elements of a country’s expenditure. 
This form of aid mainly includes budget support, balance of payment support, debt relief in order 
to support the expenditure of recipient countries. Funds are usually accounted for based on 
balance of payment or government budget. Under the government budget, funds go into boosting 
revenue to finance expenditures and increasing overall spending. 
3) Technical Assistance 
Technical Assistance helps in the provision of skills, knowledge know-how and advice. This 
form of aid has been provided in primary and secondary education in recipient countries and this 
has been in form of teaching staff. Also, to meet developing countries’ needs, specialized trainers 
have performed the job of skills training. Despite all the advantages of technical assistance, there 
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are still a lot of problems accompanied by it and this includes the increased cost (especially 
consultancy costs) of providing the assistance. 
4) Humanitarian Aid or Emergency Aid 
According to Conchesta (2008), this form of aid is given to relieve suffering, save lives during 
and after natural and manmade disasters (like war).  This kind of aid involves the provision of 
vital services (like food aid) and fundings (like logistics or transport) through either the aid 
agencies or the government of affected countries. Humanitarian aid has gone a long way to 
providing food, saving lives, health care services and so on. 
4) Food Aid 
Food aid comprises of programme food aid and humanitarian food aid. Programme food aid may 
relieve the foreign exchange constraint to the import of the necessary intermediate inputs or by 
providing fiscal resources through counterpart funds generated by the local sale of programme 
food aid (Barret, 1998). These resources can be used by the recipient country to invest in 
agricultural research and extension and improvement of rural infrastructure. However, 
programme food aid may have Dutch disease effects on domestic food producers and thus 
hurting the food sector’s competitiveness in the world markets (as cited from Conchesta, 2008) 
2.1.4 Organizations That Give Foreign Aid (Foreign Aid Donors) 
1) World Bank group  
2) International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
3) International fund for Agricultural Development 
4) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
5) World Trade Organization (WTO) 
6) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
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7) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
8) African Development Bank (ADB) 
9) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
10) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (as part of World Bank Group) 
 
 
2.1.5 Trends of Foreign Aid in Sub Saharan Africa. 
The flow of development aid to sub Saharan Africa has undergone different fluctuations over 
time. The exact trend of this fluctuation depends most importantly on the measure of aid flow 
adopted (Wako, 2011). Aggregate aid in constant US dollars rose steadily from 1960 to 1990 in 
the sub Saharan Africa region, followed by a considerable drop beginning from 1991 (ibid). This 
later recovered in 2001, with a sharp rise in 2005. Before the 1990s, flows of Net ODA and Net 
aid transfer were moving closely with Gross ODA though afterwards, there was the evidence of 
considerable divergences among the three measures (Wako, 2011). The divergence between 
Gross ODA and Net ODA explained the rise in the amounts of offsetting entries while that 
between NODA (net ODA) and Net Aid Transfer showed that there was an increase in the share 
of debt relief particularly in the form of pardoned accumulated interests in the aid to the region. it 
was noticed by Wako (2011) that the real flow of aid to the sub Saharan Africa region has 
declined over the years than what the records show us. Although, this report may not differ from 
other results which show aid effectiveness, it nullifies the validity of any argument based on a 
wrong variable; gross ODA or Net ODA (ibid). Contrary to the rise in volume of aid in dollar 
amounts, aid per capita generally followed a downward trend. The third alternative way of 
measuring aid entails the use of aid-to-GDP ratio. Regarding the pattern of NAT relative to 
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recipient’s GDP, bilateral NAT and total NAT experienced more or less declining trends – 
particularly after 1994. Multilateral NAT experienced a slight rising trend between 1980 and 
1994, then a slighter drop until 2000 and leveling off at about two percent of GDP .Between the 
period of 1980 and 1984, the convergence of bilateral and multilateral aids relative to GDP 
disappeared (Hassen Wako, 2011). The share of bilateral aid to the sample of countries in the 
region has generally been falling and that of multilateral aid has generally been rising. However, 
bilateral donors still remains the major sources of aid to these countries on aggregate though 
there are exceptions for some individual countries. The sub Saharan Africa region is still the 
largest recipient of aid no matter the type of aid observed sent to developing countries. Apart 
from 1998- 2001, where Asia received the largest share, Africa always secured the largest 
amount of aid (Wako, 2011).  
Examining the donors of aid (both bilateral and multilateral donors), in terms of Net ODA, 
France was the leading donor from 1980 to 2001. After 2001, USA became the leading donor. 
By 2006, France was ranked third behind USA and UK. Also, most recently, other countries 
have joined the list of major bilateral donors including, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Belgium and Arab countries (OECD, 2006). Examining the major multilateral donors to the SSA 
region, World Bank has been the largest donor for most of the period from 1980-2006 
approximately. Another strong donor is the European union which was the leading donor 
between 1980 and 1985 and took occasional leads in 1888, 1989, 1992 and 2006. For the period 
of 1980-2006, 2 multilateral donor- World Bank and European commission- accounted for about 
65 percent of the total multilateral aid to SSA. On individual terms, the share of the World Bank 
which is about 33.5 percent is slightly above that of European commission which is about 30.5 
percent. Also, it is understood that various factors could affect the allocation of aid among 
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recipients in SSA and as such, measures of aid including dollar amounts, aid/ GDP, aid per 
capita has been reviewed against each other. According to Wako (2011), the average share in the 
total Net aid transfer showed Tanzania and Ethiopia in first and second place respectively. 
However, through the data supplied by Wako (2011), the 10 recipients of aid could not stand the 
change of the measure of aid forms adopted. When aid to the GDP ratio or aid per capita was 
used as a measure, the list changed as Mozambique was one of the top ten recipients. No country 
according to Wako (2011) considered as a major recipient in terms of the percentage share out of 
the total NAT to SSA, appeared in the list of the top ten recipient countries when aid was 
measured using aid per capita criterion (ibid). Therefore, in general, using different measures of 
aid gave an inconsistent list of countries as the major aid recipients in sub Saharan Africa. 
Countries which were once at the top disappeared when “aid per capita ’or aid to GDP ratio’ 
criterion was adopted. However, according to Wako (2011), the disturbance or inconsistency in 
the list of major recipients which results from replacing total aid by bilateral or multilateral aid 
was immaterial. 
2.2 Theories of Foreign Aid and Economic Development 
Economic development is dependent on many factors and they include the quality of labour 
force, resources (natural and financial), capital, technology and the institutional setting of 
economic activities. In the 1950s and 1960s, early economic growth theories maintained that the 
basic problem of developing countries was attributed to capital formation in achieving economic 
growth and so these theories were of the opinion that development assistance was needed for the 
developing countries to fill the finance and technology gap. These gaps were popularly known as 
the trade and savings gap. According to the traditional position given by Chenery and Strout, all 
capital inflows constitute net additions to a less developing country’s productive resources thus 
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increasing its economic growth. This argument is based on the two gap model whereby foreign 
capital inflows aided growth by removing foreign exchange and domestic exchange gap 
(Conchesta Kabete, 2008). This argument was however challenged by the Radical Economists 
who gave their argument that foreign capital inflow had a depressing effect on the propensity of 
the developing countries to save. These led to a reduction in the domestic savings rate and lower 
rate of capital formation and thus lower growth rates. These economists argued that foreign aid 
was a substitute and not a complement to domestic savings. We shall therefore be examining 
some of the theories explained in various literature reviews. 
2.2.1 Harrod-Domar Model 
The Harrod-Domar model was propounded by Sir Roy .F. Harrod in 1936 and Evsey Domar in 
1946 and explains that total output is dependent on the rate of investment and the productivity of 
that investment. The model is used to explain economy’s growth rate based on savings and 
capital productivity. The Harrod Domar model implies that poor countries should borrow finance 
investment in capital for economic growth. In an open economy, savings (both foreign and 
domestic) is a major source of investment.  According to Easterly W. (2003), the model is 
expressed as:   
g = (I/Y) /μ ……….. (1) 
I/Y= A/Y + S/Y …………. (2) 
where I is required investments, Y is output; g is GDP growth target, 
 A is aid; S is domestic saving and μ the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). 
The ICOR shows the ratio of investment to growth rate. It shows how much additional capital is 
needed for additional output. The incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) ranges between 2 and 
5. A low ICOR is a measure of high quality of investment while a high ICOR implied a low 
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investment quality. ICOR helped to estimate capital investments, the amount of aid flows needed 
to attain the target growth rate and was used in quantitative planning. 
Savings in general is needed to increase growth as it provides means for investment though there 
lay doubt over the assumption of a stable linear relationship between investment and growth. For 
developing countries to reduce their dependence on foreign aid flows there is need to increase 
the propensity to save as this would provide funds needed for investments. There has been 
various criticisms of the Harrod Domar model one being on the assumption of a stable ICOR. 
According to Griffin (1970), aid inflows has increased ICOR in developing countries and this 
has lowered the efficiency of capital output because aid are usually invested in “prestigious 
projects that stand as monuments to the generosity of the politically motivated donors” . 
therefore, according to Snowdon (2010), if aid has a negative effect on ICOR, the impact of aid 
on growth reduces and might even become negative as significant amounts of aid are put into 
use. 
2.2.2 The Two Gap Model 
The second gap is the trade gap or foreign exchange gap and it supports the Harrod-Domar 
model of investment increasing growth. This occurs when there is a gap between import 
requirements for a given level of production and foreign exchange earnings. This gap states that 
foreign aid fills the gap of required import spending and actual export earnings. It is also 
assumed that both imports and exports are linearly dependent on income and there is a target rate 
of income. Even though the saving investment gap would be small, a larger trade gap would 
undermine productive investment due to limited imports of capital goods needed for investment. 
It is argued that either the trade gap or the foreign exchange gap is binding in developing 
countries and foreign aid helps to fill either of the gaps. 
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These gaps will only be filled if incentives to invest are approving. Foreign aid would not 
increase investment if there is little or no incentives for investment and if the productivity of 
such investments is questionable since the flows would go to consumption rather than investment 
(White, 1992). Conchesta (2008) stated that apart from the two gap model explained, there are 
factors limiting growth in aid dependent countries and they include low levels of technology, 
education, poor infrastructure, increased growth in population, interests paid on debts and 
political instability evident in some developing countries. This model has been criticized on the 
grounds that the problem of developing countries is not necessarily the insufficiency of domestic 
savings or foreign exchange gap but the inadequacy of policies as regarding trade and foreign 
exchange.  
2.2.3 Three Gap Model 
The three gap model, refers to the saving- investment gap, trade gap and the fiscal gap 
(Conchesta, 2008). The fiscal gap refers to a gap between government revenues and expenditures 
although the fiscal gap is a subset of the saving gap. Due to this fiscal gap, government efforts to 
stimulate private investment may be restrained when government resources for investment and 
imports are among other things, a result of debt service. There is enough evidence showing that 
government expenditures in Sub-Saharan African countries have been curtailed by foreign debt 
service despite different initiatives. Thus, the closing of this fiscal gap may be facilitated by 
external resources directed to the government budget. 
In contrast, if aid is in form of a loan and not a grant, it may have adverse implications for the 
savings, foreign exchange and fiscal gaps in the long-run and for the macroeconomic 
performance in general. For example, debt payment creates a further demand on foreign currency 
and government revenue in general. “Also debt service can result in the reduction of import 
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capacity of the government thus reducing government investment, particularly in infrastructure, 
education and health facilities, a factor which is likely to affect negatively private 
investments”(Conchesta Kabete, 2008). Snowdon (2010) however criticized that foreign aid 
most times would not boost total savings and would in fact reduce domestic savings. 
 
 
2.3 Empirical Issues  
2.3.1 Foreign Aid and Economic Development 
There have been different debates and opinions about the effect of foreign aid on economic 
performance. One side states that there is a positive relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth or development while the other side is based on the opinion of an inverse 
relationship between foreign aid and economic development. Yet another side states that there is 
no relationship whatsoever between foreign aid and economic development in sub Saharan 
Africa. Thus, there has actually been no straightforward answer to the question of aid 
effectiveness. 
  According to Whitaker (2006), there is a positive relationship between aid and economic 
growth especially in countries that have sound policies that facilitates trade and the economy at 
large. This is also supported by Burnside and Dollar, Farah Abuzeid and Durbarry et al (1998) 
foreign aid also leads to economic growth if good fiscal policies and strong institutions are in 
place. The kinds of policies here encompasses ensuring small, if any, budget deficits, controlling 
inflation, as well as trade openness and globalization though according to Durbarry, geographical 
factor is also a determinant of aid effectiveness. Mosley also suggested that there was a positive 
relationship between economic development and foreign aid; this is because aid helps to supply 
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international capital. Farah Abuzeid suggested the evidence that there is a growing consensus 
where aid is deemed effective under another determining factor which is institutions as the Big 
push theory can only work when there are reformed institutions and policies. Gupta (1975), 
Stoneman (1975), Gulati (1978), McGowan and Smith (1978) and Bradshaw (1985) also found 
positive relationships between foreign capital and economic growth. According to Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), World Bank (1998), aid is much more effective in environments characterized by 
high institutions quality as part of a capable developmental state. Todd Moss et al suggests that 
‘institutional development is an independent variable which affects the productivity of aid and is 
a recognized factor used to select and allocate to aid recipients. Whitaker (2006) also showed 
that the fact that massive amounts of foreign aid has been forwarded by developed nations and 
international institutions yet there has been perceived lack of result from this raises the question 
as to the actual effectiveness of foreign aid to less developed country. The result of his study was 
that foreign aid had a positive effect but factors like conflict and geography lessens the impact 
and can even make it negative. It was suggested by the World Bank that increasing foreign aid 
flows by $10 billion would lift about 25 million people out of poverty per year, provided that 
such countries have sound economic management. The figure drops to 7 million people for 
countries when it is vice versa. 
The other side disagrees and is of the opinion that foreign aid has a negative effect on economic 
growth because it encourages corruption, encourages rent seeking behaviors and erodes 
bureaucratic institutions. Ali and Isse (2005) also showed that aid is bound by decreasing 
marginal returns thus explaining another way in which development assistance can be 
unfavourable to economic growth. Boone (1995) discovered that in the 1970s and 1980s, aid 
intensive African countries experienced no economic growth though foreign aid as measured by 
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share of GDP was actually increasing. Foreign aid in increased volume erodes bureaucratic and 
institutional quality as well as increases in the level of corruption and encourages rent seeking 
behavior (Knack, 2001). Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958) also on foreign aid efficiency stated 
that politicians do not allocate aid properly as measured against the set goals and targets. 
Recipient countries would then misuse capital inflows since lack of domestic savings show lack 
of opportunities. Bauer (1976) also claimed that there is a negative casual relationship between 
aid and growth in low developing countries. This is because aid hinders growth by substituting 
for savings and investment rather than acting as their supplements. According to Djankov, et al 
(2005), foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result into 
rent-seeking behavior. It was also discovered that foreign aid had a negative effect on 
democracy. The effect of oil rents on political institutions was also measured and aid was seen as 
a bigger curse than oil.  
There has been a renewed interest in explaining the cross country economic growth to explain 
the exact effect of foreign aid on the economy. Hall and Jones argue that differences between 
countries in capital accumulation, productivity, and output per worker can ultimately be 
attributed to differences in “social infrastructure,” which they define as “the institutions and 
government policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals 
accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output.  
There is also a need for specific country case study because many of the literature on foreign aid 
and development in recipient countries only use international cross section statistical 
investigations rather than individual country case study (Riddell, 1987; Mosley et al, 1987). The 
results of the cross section studies depend on the countries and the periods of study chosen and 
such studies face problems of interpretation and measurement as the structural features of 
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individual countries are ignored. Boone (1995) concluded that aid does not significantly increase 
investment and growth but it increases the size of government. Fiscal analyst and donors are of 
the opinion that aid process is weakened by the ability of the recipient governments to alter their 
spending patterns to undermine the sectoral distribution of expenditure for designated projects 
(Conchesta, 2008). 
A few studies (Heller, 1975; Khilji and Zampelli, 1991; Pack and Pack, 1993) have supported the 
theoretical proposition that developing countries have been rendering foreign aid fungible by 
transferring resources from the donor-aid sectors to non-donor aided sectors. According to the 
World Bank's 1998 report, assessing aid, countries with good monetary, fiscal and trade policies 
( i.e. good policy environment) registered high positive effect of aid. Such good policy 
environment depends on the donor or recipient count. However, of great importance is whether 
recipient countries spend donor funds on intended purposes. Studies using time series data in 
individual countries (Levy, 1987; McGuire, 1978, 1987; Gang and Khan, 1990; Pack and Pack, 
1990) found no significant diversion and all agree that countries spend foreign aid funds on the 
designated purposes. 
At sectoral level, Feyzioglu et al, (1998) found that aid is fungible on earmarked concessional 
loans for agriculture, education and energy, but not for transport and communication sectors. 
Pack and Pack (1990, 1993) concur with Feyzioglu, et al (in the case of Indonesia and Sri Lanka) 
that strong fly paper effect does occur on concessional loans (but the results differ with data on 
the Dominican Republic). The evidence that aid money increases government expenditure means 
that the recipient governments do use the increased resources as they choose to increase 
spending, cut taxes or reduce fiscal deficits. 
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Further on the effect of foreign aid on government expenditure, Devarajan, et al (1998) found 
that most aid (about 90%) boosted government expenditure with no significant evidence of tax 
relief. About half the aid was used to finance external debt service payments; one quarter to 
finance investments and the other quarter to offset current account deficits. On the other hand, 
Swaroop et al (2000), focusing on the effects of foreign aid on expenditure decisions of central 
government of India, found that foreign aid merely substitute for already earmarked government 
spending; the central government spends funds obtained through aid on non-development 
activities. This means that government choices are unaffected by external sources of finance. 
Finally, empirical literature using both panel and time series data supports the notion that aid 
increases government expenditure. For a recent comprehensive survey of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on foreign aid and growth, Hudson (2004) and McGillivray, et al. (2006) can 
be checked on. 
A study conducted by McGillivray (2005) demonstrates how aid to African countries not only 
increases growth but also reduces poverty. Furthermore, the author points out the important fact 
that continuously growing poverty, mainly in sub-Saharan African countries, compromises the 
MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) main target of dropping the percentage of people living 
in extreme poverty to half the 1990 level by 2015. His research econometrically analyzes 
empirical, time series data for 1968-1999. The paper concludes that the policy regimes of each 
country, such as inflation and trade openness, influence the amounts of aid received. 
Ouattara (2006) analyzed the effect of aid flows on key fiscal aggregates in Senegal. The paper 
utilized data over the time period 1970 – 2000 and focused on the relationship between aid and 
debt. Three conclusions were made out of the study. First, that a large portion of aid flows, 
approximately 41%, goes into financing Senegal’s debt and 20% of the government’s resources 
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are goes to debt servicing. Second, the impact of aid flows on domestic expenditures is 
statistically insignificant, and lastly, that debt servicing has a significant negative effect on 
domestic expenditure. Thus, his paper concluded that debt reduction could become a more 
successful policy tool than obtaining additional loans. Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray 
(2005) examined trends in official aid to Africa over the period 1960 to 2002. The authors 
highlighted that the decrease in aid over the last decade which will have an impact on Africans 
living in poverty and the African economy as a whole. As a result of the shortfall in aid, the 
MDGs will be much harder if not impossible to be achieved. Thus, the paper concluded that aid 
do promote growth and reduce poverty. In addition, it also positively impacts public sector 
aggregates as it contributes to increase public spending and lowers domestic borrowing. 
However, the MGDs cannot be achieved with development aid alone as innovative sources of 
development finance need to be considered. 
Karras (2006) looked into the correlation between foreign aid and growth in per capita GDP 
using data from 1960 to 1997 for a sample of 71 aid-receiving developing countries and the 
paper concluded that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is positive, permanent, and 
statistically significant. Therefore, without considering the effect of policies, an increase in 
foreign aid by $20 per person leads to an increase in the growth rate of real GDP per capita by 
0.16 percent. 
Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissay (2005) addressed directly the mechanisms through which aid 
influenced growth. A sample of 25 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1970 to 1997 
was looked into and the authors concluded that foreign aid had a significant positive effect on 
economic growth. Furthermore, they identified investment as the most significant transmission 
instrument. The paper also concluded that Africa’s poor growth profile should be attributed to 
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factors other than aid ineffectiveness. Rather than using a large pool of data for numerous 
developing countries, Quartey’s (2005) paper focused on innovative ways of making financial 
aid effective in Ghana and noted that the government and its partners need to plan better and 
coordinate their efforts to make MDBS (multi-donor budgetary support) successful. Quartey 
(2005) also suggested that government work towards reducing its debt burden so that aid inflows 
would not just be mainly used to service debt. 
Economic research on foreign aid effectiveness and economic growth has frequently become a 
political topic. Burnside and Dollar (2000) searched the links between aid, policy, and growth 
and found that foreign aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good 
fiscal, monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies. This result 
has enormous policy implications and as such it provides a role and strategy for foreign aid. 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) reassesses whether foreign aid influences growth in the 
presence of good policies using more data and concluded that adding new data raises reservation 
on the effectiveness of aid. According to Easterly (2003), achieving a beneficial aggregate 
impact of foreign aid remains a mystery. In his research, Ram (2004) looks at the issue of 
poverty and economic growth from the view of recipient country’s policies being the important 
element in the effectiveness of foreign aid. Nevertheless, in his paper the author disagrees with 
the accepted view that redirecting aid toward countries with better policies leads to higher 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Based on his research the author concluded that 
evidence is lacking to support the leading belief that directing foreign assistance to countries 
with good ‘policy’ will increase the impact on growth or poverty reduction in developing 
countries. According to Farah Abuzeid, Sound policy and good economic management is more 
important than foreign aid for developing countries. Bauer claimed that the problem is that aid 
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goes to governments whose policies retard growth and create poverty (1993) and these countries 
have incentives to make sure their institutions remain of poor quality because this will lead to 
more economic crises and an increase in aid flows (Azam and Laffont 2003).  
The improvement of institutions is very important to decreasing inequality because better, more 
democratic institutions helps government to meet the needs of the poor (Reuveny and Lee 2003). 
Better institutions and governance also decreases inequality by redistributing income through 
effective taxation and by decreasing the influence of the “high-income political elites” through 
crackdowns on corruption. As the record shows, without good institutions, aid is likely to have a 
detrimental impact on the quality of governance in a recipient developing country. In the absence 
of these strong institutions, assistance efforts should be dedicated to improving the quality of 
governance before they can be effectively devoted to any economic development effort. 
Rodrik (1998) argued that in the 1980s and 1990s countries with weak institutions are unable to 
deal with major economic shocks and this reflected in the slow performance of less developed 
countries. Therefore, according to Osabuohien and Ike (2011), economies with weak institutions 
move at a slow economic transformation rate because they would have difficulties in dealing 
with political and economic shock experiences. 
According to Kaufmann et al (2005), there are six indicators of institutions and they include: 
political stability, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness and rule of law. 
The political stability index shows the likelihood of the government being overthrown by 
unconstitutional means. This index used as a proxy for democracy. Studies including that of 
Williamson (1995), Aron (2000), Acemoglu et al (2001) have shown that the democratic a 
country is, the higher the income levels of such country 
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The voice and accountability index shows the extent to which political and civil rights are 
respected and practiced including the freedom of citizens to choose their government and the 
degree of freedom of press (Sanjeev) 
The regulatory quality index shows the extent to which the government has control over the 
output market, banking system, international trade and business development. This index shows 
an establishment and favourable performance of a market based economic system thus 
encouraging an efficient allocation of resources. 
The control of corruption index looks into the absence of corruption which is defined to mean the 
exercise public power for private gain. Control of corruption identifies the reduction of rent 
seeking behavior which would enhance efficiency and productivity (Sanjeev). 
 The government effectiveness index looks at the quality of policies that are implemented and the 
quality of basic services such as education and health. In other words, this index measures the 
quality of both public and civil service and the soundness of the government’s policies (Sanjeev). 
The rule of law index shows the quality of property rights protection and the incidence of crime, 
the effectiveness of the law enforcing agents (judiciary) and the extent to which contracts are 
enforced (Sanjeev). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction: 
This chapter focuses on the procedures for the collection and analysis of data. After examining 
substantially the related literature review on foreign aid and economic development in Sub 
Saharan Africa, the next is the method of data collection and analysis called the Research 
Methodology. Research methodology is to provide a detailed account of the methods used in the 
collection of data, why these methods were chosen, the data obtained and how they are analyzed 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
There has been evolutions and emergence of different growth theories over the years as several 
models and theories of growth have emerged. The theoretical framework that would be used to 
explain distinctly the relationship between foreign aid and economic development in sub Saharan 
Africa would be the new endogenous growth theory which came from Lucas Romer’s 
modification of the old neo classical growth theory (Mallick and Moore, 2006). The main 
contributors to the new endogenous growth theory are Arrow (1962), Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988). The endogenous growth theory recognises the vital importance of the endogeniaty of 
capital (that is, human capital and research and development activities) in the growth process. 
The neoclassical model emphasised that technical progress or total factor productivity growth are 
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exogenously determined or given but the endogenous theory implies that growth is as a result of 
‘the learning by doing’ effect which occurs between both physical and human capital (Mallick 
and Moore, 2006). The model also assumed constant or increasing returns to scale with non 
diminishing marginal productivity of capital instead of the assumption of constant returns of 
capital with diminishing marginal productivity of capital in the neoclassical growth theory 
(Mallick and Moore, 2006).  
The assumption of increasing returns to capital of the new growth theory shows that foreign aid 
would most likely increase growth and development well into the future or long run. Another 
striking contribution of the endogenous growth theory is the recognition of the importance of 
human capital in the growth or in this case, development process as according to Mallick and 
Moore (2006), it is seen as a vital source of long term growth which is either in form of direct 
input to research (Romer, 1990) or representing positive externalities (Lucas, 1988).  The human 
capital variables included in the model help to capture quality differences in labour force as 
investment in non physical capital helps to increase the labour force productivity. According to 
Barro and Lee (1993), these are mainly related to education and are measured by an index which 
is either mean years of schooling or school enrolment (Mallick and Moore, 2006) The 
effectiveness of foreign aid on economic development has been based on this theory since 
foreign aid could be a very important factor in the contribution of human capital (Kargbo, 2012). 
For instance, Lucas assumed that investing in education leads to production of human capital 
which is a very crucial determinant of the development process. According to Jhingan (2004), 
research and development or investment has become vital in the new growth theory. This theory 
as such suggests that developing countries also engage in trade with developed countries in order 
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to gain new knowledge in research and development and new technologies. Hence there is a need 
to encourage trade openness.  
The new growth theory also recognises the usefulness of policies to economic growth and 
development as they enhance public and private investment in human capital and this justifies 
the inclusion of policy variables in the aid growth regressions. A very consistent concept in this 
growth model is the importance of capital to determine economic growth and development. 
There could be, however, other determinants of growth but the inclusion of capital (both physical 
and human capital) is a very important determinant of economic growth and development in 
developing countries. It is therefore very imperative as according to Kargbo (2012) to 
empirically prove if it is all types of capital that determines the economic performance of 
developing countries. Therefore, both physical capital (proxied by Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation) and human capital (as proxied by school enrolment rate) are included in the model to 
be regressed. As a result, foreign aid as a key source of capital is also included to determine 
economic development in sub Saharan Africa. 
In conclusion, the new endogenous growth theory holds that economic growth is a result of the 
accumulation of physical capital (and human capital) and an expansion of the labour force. The 
endogenous growth theory is based on the idea that output in an economy is produced by a 
combination of labour (L) and capital (K), under increasing returns, so that the theory 
distinguishes between physical and human capital. This can be expressed mathematically: 
 Y = f (L, K, A)……………………………………… (1) 
The aggregate production function above is assumed to be characterized by increasing 
returns to scale. Thus, in the special case of Cobb-Douglas production function at any time t, 
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Y(t) = K(t)[A(t)L(t)    .........................................(2) 
where 
Y = Quantity of output or Gross domestic product 
A = productivity of labour which grows over time at an exogenous rate. 
L = Labour 
K = Stock of capital (which includes human capital as well as physical capital). 
According to Gwartney et al. (2004), another approach to fully understand the growth theory is 
the institutions approach. This approach includes institutions as being an important determinant 
and having an important role to play. Institutions are seen to affect the availability and 
productivity of resources and so actions supporting property rights and freedom of exchange for 
credible policy commitments should be encouraged. Also, the government should strengthen the 
role of political and legal environment among other functions. This is in line with the opinion of 
North (1990) who emphasised that the ‘third world countries’ are poor because their institutional 
constraints defines a set of pay offs of political activities that does not encourage production 
activities (Wako, 2011). Hansen and Trap (2000) explained that over the years, considering the 
institutions approach to growth; progressions have been made on the topic of aid effectiveness. 
The progressions have included making use of panel data, inclusion of institutions in the growth 
regression, recognition of the endogeneity of aid and other variables and explicit recognition of 
linearity in aid-growth relationship (Wako, 2011) 
3.3 Specification of Model 
This section discusses the model specifications to examine the relationships between foreign aid 
and per capita GDP growth.  
The study model is therefore specified as: 
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                                    ……………………………(1) 
              
                           ……………………. (2) 
 
The dependent variable in this instance is the Per Capita Gross Domestic Product while the 
explanatory variables are official development assistance, institutional quality, gross fixed capital 
formation, labour force input and human capital. In order to effectively capture economic 
development using Real GDP per capita, we take the logarithm of GDP (which has been used 
also by Hezer and Morrissey, 2011; Adhikary, 2011) because the log difference of Real GDP per 
capita implies economic development. Also, all the other regressors are expressed in logarithms 
too. 
                                                         
            
   ……(3) 
Taking the natural logarithm of equation 2, the function is written as: 
 
            
                                                  
                                  
Where:              
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The apriori expectations are: 
                              
  >0: there is a positive relationship between gross fixed capital formation and GDP per capita. 
The higher the GFCF, the higher the economic development of a country and vice versa. 
  >0: there is a positive relationship between labor force input and GDP per capita.  
  > 0 there is a positive relationship between foreign aid and GDP. The higher the ODA 
received by a country, the higher the GDP. 
  >0: there is a direct, positive relationship between institutions and GDP such that the stronger 
the institution, the higher the rate of GDP. When there is a strong institutional framework, there 
is increased investment and economic development and vice versa. 
  >0: there is a direct relationship between human capital development (which is proxied by 
tertiary enrolment rate) and economic development. The higher the rate of human capital 
development, the higher the economic development of a country. 
3.4 Description of Variables 
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1) Foreign Aid: this is a term that was used by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to 
measure aid. It is widely used as an indicator of international aid flows. ODA needs to 
contain the three elements: 
a) it must be undertaken by the official sector 
b) with the promotion of economic development 
c)  concessional financial terms( if a loan, having a grant of at least 25 percent). 
This definition has been used to exclude development aid from the other two categories of aid 
defined by the DAC members 
2) Institutions: Institutions mainly looks at the quality of a country’s institution in terms of 
its political standing, rule of law, control of corruption, etc. This shows the average of 
political rights and civil liberties measure and each indicator of institutions is measured 
on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 implying the highest degree of freedom and seven being the 
lowest. 
3) Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Gross fixed capital formation is a flow value and is 
expressed by the total value of a producer’s acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets 
during the accounting period plus certain additions to the value of non- produced assets 
(such as subsoil assets or major improvements in the quantity, quality or productivity of 
land) realized by the productive activity of institutional units. 
4) Labour force:  The labour force consists of people who are actively employed or are 
seeking employment. 
5) Human Capital: human capital measures the economic value of an employee’s skill set. It 
shows or examines the stock of competencies, knowledge, social and personality 
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attributes including creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce 
economic value. 
3.5 Sources Of Data And Measurement 
Data is obtained from secondary sources and it covers the period of 1996-2010. The economic 
development rate is measured in this study as the growth of real GDP per capita in constant 
(2000) U.S. dollars. The data on the dependent variable and independent variables are from the 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. The data on institutional quality are from the 
World Governance indicators database. 
3.6 Technique of Estimation 
Here the technique of estimation used is discussed and the justification for this technique is 
established. The advantages of using panel data over the usage of time-series and cross-sectional 
data have been reviewed in different literature. According to Verbeek (2000), the major 
advantages of using panel data are that, it helps in identifying parameters in the presence of  
measurement error, the robustness of panel-data-based models to omitted variables, and the 
efficiency of parameter estimates because of the larger sample size with explanatory variables 
changing over two dimensions (Wako, 2011). Based on the evaluated advantages of panel data 
over others, the panel data would as such be used in examining aid effectiveness. The adoption 
of OLS in panel data analysis has been criticized in various studies particularly where the lagged 
dependent variable enters the set of explanatory variables as is seen in the case of foreign aid 
(Wako, 2011).  According to Bond et al. (2001), Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006b), the 
correlation between the lagged value of the dependent variable or any endogenous explanatory 
variable and the individual-specific, time-invariant effect(s) makes the OLS estimates biased and 
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inconsistent (Wako, 2011). Bond (2002) also noted that the inconsistency of pooled OLS still 
exists even if the serial correlation of the error term is assumed away. According to Bond, 
(2002), Buhai (2003), in order to allow for country-specific heterogeneity and considering the 
potential gain in efficiency, fixed effects, the between effects and the random effects models are 
used in many researches. However, though the transforming techniques of these static panel data 
techniques could provide lags of the variables as their instruments and imply the consistency of 
such estimates, such a consistency is not applicable to short panels with many individuals (large 
N) observed over short periods (small T) (Wako, 2011). While the use of the Within Groups 
estimation eliminates individual heterogeneity, it does not account for the issue of 
dynamism/persistency of the dependent variable (growth rate of GDP per capita in this case) 
(Bond, 2002; Buhai, 2003). Thus, regressing the models specified earlier requires a better 
method of estimation in situations where regressors could be endogenous, where individual-
specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of individual disturbances (part of 
the error term that varies both over time and across individuals) are likely, where the time 
dimension of the panel data is small, and where there is no much hope for good exogenous 
instruments. There has been much support for the use of GMM in cross-country literature. 
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort supported the use of the GMM panel data estimator in analyzing 
conditional convergence in the Augmented Solow Growth Model. As Roodman (2006b) 
explained the differenced-GMM and the system-GMM estimators are developed to suit panel 
data analysis under such conditions. System-GMM is argued, for instance, in Bond et al. (2001), 
Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006b), to fit growth regressions better than the differenced-GMM, 
particularly with near unit-root series (Wako, 2011).  The GMM estimation is often possible 
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where a likelihood analysis is extremely difficult. Estimation of the models were handled using 
the statistical software STATA version 10.  
3.7 Method of Analysis 
This research work will be based on the use of an Econometric method specifically the GMM 
system estimator because this form of regression, according to Levine et al (2000) has a more 
reliable small sample properties when it comes to bias and precision when the dependent variable 
is persistent. The sub Saharan African countries to be examined would be a total of at least 40 
countries based on the amount of data available for each.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the empirical analyses and their results which were carried out on the models as 
well as their economic interpretation of findings obtained from the study shall be looked into. In 
order to effectively examine if foreign aid and the other variables affect economic development 
in sub Saharan Africa as well as the other objectives mentioned in the earlier chapter, this 
chapter shall look into both the descriptive and econometric analyses. The descriptive analysis 
majorly focuses on the unique statistical characteristics of the variables. The econometric 
analysis includes the pair wise correlation test, ordinary pool regression, fixed effect regression, 
random effect regression, the Hausman test and the system GMM test. 
4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Data.  
This analysis looks at the trend of variables of different countries over the time period.  This 
section also shows the individual characteristics of the variables used in the model. 
49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
LRGDPK 689 6.201314 1.076913 4.062166 9.088173 
LGFCF 623 20.14106 1.513775 15.78959 24.5029 
LLAB 675 14.69456 1.508442 10.60906 17.73351 
LAID 687 19.51093 1.259951 16.2751 23.24096 
ROL 537 -0.6938175 0.6407454 -2.23 1.06 
COC 563 -0.5925222 0.5890245 -2.06 1.25 
LHUKP 357 0.982328 0.9031915 -1.518684 3.214868 
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 10. 
The mean shows the average of the various variables. It is the average value of the series 
obtained by adding up the series and dividing by the number of observations. The mean for Real 
GDP Per Capita is given as 6.201314; the mean for Gross fixed capital formation is given as 
20.14106. The mean for Labour is 14.69456, that for foreign aid is 19.51093. The mean for rule 
of law is given as -0.6938175 while that of control of corruption is given as -0.5925222. Lastly, 
the mean for human capital is 0.982328. 
The standard deviation explains how spread out a variable is around its mean.it is a measure of 
dispersion or spread in the series. The standard deviation value of Real GDP Per Capita is 
1.076913. The standard deviation value of gross fixed capital formation is 1.513775. The 
standard deviation value for Labour is given as 1.508442. The standard deviation value for 
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foreign aid is 1.259951. The value of the standard deviation for Rule of Law, Control of 
Corruption and Human capital are 0.6407454, 0.5890245 and 0.9031915 respectively. For the 
variables (LRGDPK, LGFCF, LLAB, ROL, COC, HUKP) the standard deviation is low 
compared to their mean. This shows a small coefficient of variation. 
Maximum and minimum are the maximum and minimum values of the series in the current 
sample. The minimum of RGDPK is 4.062166 while the maximum is 9.088173, the minimum of 
GFCF is 15.78959 while the maximum is 24.5029, the minimum of LAB is 10.60906 while the 
maximum is 17.73351, the minimum of AID is 16.2751 while the maximum is 23.24096, the 
minimum of ROL, COC and HUKP are -2.23, -2.06 and -1.518684 respectively while their 
maximum are 1.06, 1.25 and 3.214868 respectively. 
4.2.2 Econometrics Analyses 
Here, the ordinary pooled regression, fixed effect regression, Random effect regression. 
Hausman test and the main GMM test shall be conducted and their results explained 
respectively. Real GDP Per Capita which is the dependent variable was logged, and all other 
independent variables excluding Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. This is because they 
carry negative values and negative values are not to be logged. 
4.2.2.1The pair wise correlation test 
Table 2: Pair wise correlation test 
 Gfcf Lab Aid Rol Coc hukp 
Gfcf 1.0000      
Lab 0.3611 1.0000     
Aid 0.1744 0.6055 1.0000    
Rol 0.1648 -0.2271 -0.0885 1.0000   
Coc 0.1837 -0.2665 -0.1140 0.8609 1.0000  
Hukp 0.1905 -0.1716 -0.1425 0.4351 0.3781 1.0000 
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O. 
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The pair wise correlation test helps to check for correlation between the independent variables. If 
there is correlation between the independent variables, there would be the presence of 
multicollinearity and this would affect the efficiency and non biasness of the regression. The 
existence of no perfect correlation indicates that the independent variables which include GFCF, 
LAB, AID, ROL, COC and HUKP are not correlated with each other because the values are less 
than one, thus, there is no problem of multicollinearity among them. 
 
4.2.2.2 Ordinary Pooled Regression 
Table 3: Ordinary pooled regression test 
LRGDPK Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| 
LGfcf .4903518 .0313799 15.63 0.000 
LLab -.3869536 .0391313 -9.89 0.000 
Laid -.2972953 .0403554 -7.37 0.000 
Rol .1088395 .0748134 1.45 0.147 
Coc .0632082 .0788827 0.80 0.424 
LHukp .1698063 .0367778 4.62 0.000 
_cons 7.665361 .5322897 14.40 0.000 
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O.  
Pooled regression is usually carried out on the panel data. From the available results in the 
pooled regression, a proportionate change in GFCF would lead to a less than proportionate 
change in RGDPK. This same goes for Labour (LAB), Foreign Aid (AID), Rule of law (ROL), 
control of corruption (COC) and Human capital (HUKP).  
 Examining the t statistics, the interpretation of the t-test is such that when the absolute values of 
the independent variable are approximately 2 or above, otherwise the variable becomes 
insignificant. Looking at the table above, GFCF has a significant relationship with RGDPK. The 
same goes for all the independent variables asides ROL and COC whose absolute values were 
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less than 2. Therefore, ROL and COC have an insignificant relationship with the dependent 
variable, RGDPK. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Fixed Effect Regression 
Table 4: fixed effect regression table.                    
 Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| 
Lgfcf .0461522 .0206027 2.24 0.026 
Llab .2119504 .1132885 1.87 0.063 
Laid -.0467392 .0177235 -2.64 0.009 
Rol .1207702 .0458092 2.64 0.009 
Coc .0281721 .0334768 0.84 0.401 
Lhukp .1581069 .0242004 6.53 0.000 
_cons 2.81936 1.423865 1.98 0.049 
sigma_u .97836147    
sigma_e .08500866    
Rho .99250691    
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O. 
 The fixed effect model controls for time invariant differences that exists between countries so 
the estimated coefficients of the fixed effect model cannot be biased because of omitted time 
invariant characteristics like culture, gender, religion, race and so on. 
Looking at the figures in the above tables, the t statistics shows that there is a significant 
relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables excluding Control of 
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corruption. The test of the goodness of fit (Rho) also shows how well the model fits the data. The 
F-statistics also shows the significance of the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.4 Random effect regression table 
Table 5: Random effect regression test 
 Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| 
Lgfcf 0.1169852 .0196725 5.95 0.000 
Llab -.2950377 0.0534192 -5.52 0.000 
Laid -.0530724 .0197224 -2.69 0.007 
Rol 0.1410111 .049217 2.87 0.004 
Coc -.0126988 .0361178 -0.35 0.725 
Lhukp 0.2278372 .0205366 11.09 0.000 
_cons 8.957337 0.6743939 13.28 0.000 
sigma_u .39569066    
sigma_e .08500866    
Rho .95588169    
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O. 
The random effect regression unlike the fixed effect regression assumes that all variations across 
individuals are random and uncorrelated with the independent variables which are included in 
the model. One advantage of this regression is that it includes time invariant variables like 
gender. Random effect assumes that the entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors 
which allow for time-invariant variables to play as explanatory variables. This regression helps 
to generalize inferences beyond the sample used in the model. 
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There is a significant and inelastic relationship between the dependent variable, Real GDP Per 
Capita and Gross fixed capital formation. This means that a proportionate change in Gross fixed 
capital formation would to a less than proportionate change in Real GDP Per Capita. The same 
relationship goes for Foreign aid, Human capital. There is an inelastic relationship between 
labour and Real GDP Per Capita though it is an insignificant one. For control of corruption, there 
is a significant, inverse relationship with Real GDP Per Capita. Therefore, ironically, the more 
corruption there is, the higher the economic development. This is in accordance with the view of 
Welfe and Welfe (2009).  For rule of law, there is a significant, positive relationship between 
Rule of Law and Real GDP Per Capita. Thus, the more prevalent rule of law is, the higher the 
economic development recorded in sub Saharan Africa. 
4.2.2.5The Hausman Test 
Table 6: Hausman Test 
 Fixed(b) Randon(B) Difference(b-B) Sqrt [diag(v_b-
v_B] S.E 
Lgfcf 0.0461522 0.1169852 -0.0708331 0.006121 
Llab 0.2119504 -0.2950377 0.5069881 0.0999034 
Laid -0.0467392 -0.0530724 0.0063331 . 
Rol 0.1207702 0.1410111 -0.020241 . 
Coc 0.0281721 -0.126988 0.0408709 . 
Lhukp 0.1581069 0.2278372 -0.0697302 0.0128028 
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O. 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =   8.45 
Prob>chi2 =      0.2070 
The Hausman test helps us to choose between the fixed effect regression and the random effect 
regression. The hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed 
effects estimator. If they are, it is safe to use random effects. If the P-values are statistically 
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significant, then the fixed effects regression is used. It basically tests whether the unique errors 
are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is that they are not. Looking at the 
Hausman test table, the probability (chi-square) shows that it is not significant and as such the 
Random effect regression will be more appropriate in the study; but in order to overcome the 
challenge of endogeneity which is inherent in this study; the System Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) is considered most appropriate in order to obtain reliable estimates (Alege and 
Ogundipe, 2013). 
In order to regress the models specified earlier, there has to be a better method of estimation in 
situations where regressors could be endogenous, where individual-specific patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of individual disturbances (part of the error term that 
varies both over time and across individuals) are likely, where the time dimension of the panel 
data is small, and where there is no much hope for good exogenous instruments. Based on Past 
Literature, foreign aid is seen to have a causality effect relationship with Economic development, 
which is our dependent variable since foreign aid in some instances could be endogenous. The 
GMM estimator has also been supported in the past by Bond et al. (2001), Bond (2002) and 
Roodman (2006b) because it helps to fit growth regression. Roodman also stated extensively that 
the GMM estimators are used to suit panel data analysis in situations where conditional 
convergences in the growth models could occur. 
4.2.2.6 System dynamic panel-data estimation    
Number of obs= 215         Number of groups=40                 
Group variable: id Number of groups=40    obs per group: min=1 
Time variable: years          avg=5.375 
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Number of instruments= 82                                          Max=11 
Wald chi2(7)          =  1.81e+06     Prob > chi2           =    0.0000  
Table 7: System dynamic panel data Test.   
Lrgdpk Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
 
Lrgdpk       
L1 1.025194 0.009429 108.73 0.000 1.006713 1.043674 
Lgfcf 0.0165695 0.0006299 26.30 0.000 0.0153348 0.0178041 
Llab 0.0009856 0.0075836 0.13 0.897 -0.013878 0.0158492 
Laid -0.005013 0.0028154 -1.78 0.075 -0.0105311 0.000505 
Rol 0.0728883 0.0024538 29.70 0.000 0.0680789 0.0776977 
Coc -0.0443613 0.0043732 -10.14 0.000 -0.0529326 -0.03579 
Lhukp -0.010289 0.0044708 -2.30 0.021 -0.0190516 -0.0015265 
_cons -0.3462577 0.1468183 -2.36 0.018 -0.6340164 -0.0584991 
Source: Author’s compilation from STATA 1O.  
The table above shows the estimation of the model using the system based GMM estimator. The 
coefficient, t-statistics, probability of t-test would be employed to interpret the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables appropriately. 
Examining the coefficients of the System based GMM, for Gross fixed capital formation, a 
proportionate change in Gross fixed capital formation would lead to a less than proportionate 
change in Real GDP Per capita. There is also an inelastic relationship between the gross fixed 
capital formation and Real GDP Per Capita. For Labour, there exists an inelastic relationship 
between this variable and Real GDP Per Capita. Thus, a proportionate change in Real GDP Per 
Capita would lead to a less than proportionate change in Real GDP Per Capita. There is an 
inelastic relationship between foreign aid and Real GDP Per Capita. Therefore, a proportionate 
change in Aid would lead to a less than proportionate change in Real GDP Per Capita. There 
exists a positive and direct relationship between Rule of Law and Real GDP Per Capita. 
Therefore, a percentage change in Rule of Law by 1% would lead to a less than proportionate 
increase in Real GDP Per Capita by 7.3%. Also, there is an inverse relationship between Control 
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of corruption (COC) and Real GDP Per Capita (RGDPK). Thus, a percentage change in Control 
of corruption would lead to a less than proportionate decrease in Real GDP Per Capita by 4.4%. 
There is an inelastic relationship between Human Capital and Real GDP Per Capita and so, a 
proportionate change in Human Capital would lead to a less than proportionate change in Real 
GDP Per Capita. 
Examining the T-Test Statistics, based on the Rule of thumb, the decision rule and interpretation 
of the t-test is such that when the absolute values of the independent variable is approximately 2 
or above, the variable considered is seen as significant but when it is below 2, then it is 
considered insignificant in the model .There is a significant statistical relationship between Real 
GDP Per Capita and Gross Fixed Capital Formation. This implies that the independent variable 
can be used to explain changes in Real GDP Per Capita. Also, there is a significant relationship 
between the dependent variable, which is Real GDP Per Capita (RGDPK) and the other 
independent variables including Rule of Law, Control of corruption, Human Capital. However, 
there is an insignificant relationship between Labour (LAB) and Real GDP Per Capita. This 
implies that Labour which is the independent variable cannot be used to explain changes in the 
dependent variable. 
4.4Findings and Economic Interpretation of Results 
The results of the system based GMM estimator of each variable will be explained in light of 
economic theory. The implication of the result also on Sub Saharan Africa Region would be 
examined. The model sought to relate the proxy for economic development which is Real GDP 
Per Capita (RGDPK) to its explanatory variables Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), 
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Labour (LAB), Foreign Aid(AID), Rule of Law (ROL) and control of Corruption (COC), which 
are the proxies used for institutions and Human Capital (HUKP). 
 The Gross fixed capital formation has a significant inelastic relationship with the dependent 
variable Real GDP Per capita. This implies that a proportionate change in Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation in sub Saharan Africa would bring about a less than proportionate change in 
Economic Development. This implies, that though Gross fixed capital formation is needed for 
economic development in sub Saharan Africa; it has not been effectively utilized to produce 
optimal results. Labour as explained earlier on has an insignificant, inelastic relationship with 
Real GDP Per Capita. Therefore, this implies that in sub Saharan Africa, labour is not significant 
in explaining economic development. Human capital was also incorporated into the model in line 
with the New Growth theory and it is seen that human capital has a significant, inelastic 
relationship with Real GDP Per Capita. The economic implication for this is that although 
human capital contributed to economic development in sub Saharan Africa, a proportionate 
change in Human Capital has brought about a less than proportionate change in economic 
development. Human Capital has to be as such, maximized well to produce effective results on 
economic development. 
For foreign aid which is the main independent variable in this context, there is a significant, 
inelastic relationship with the Real GDP Per Capita. The economic implication is that, foreign 
aid contributes to Economic development in sub Saharan Africa. However, a proportionate 
change in Foreign aid leads to a less than proportionate change in the economic development of 
the region. Thus foreign aid has not been effectively used and managed as it ought to. For 
developing countries, a proportionate change in foreign aid is supposed to yield a more than 
proportionate change in economic development as reviewed in different literature (Eroglu and 
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Yavuz, Morrissey). One major reason that has been attributed for this is the presence of weak 
institutions in the region (Todd Moss, Farah Abuzeid).  Rule of law and control of corruption 
which is the chosen measure of institution show a significant relationship with Real GDP Per 
Capita. This means that institution is useful in explaining aid effectiveness as well as economic 
development in sub Saharan Africa. However, for control of corruption, there is an inverse 
relationship with Real GDP Per capita. As such, ironically, the higher the control of corruption in 
sub Saharan Africa, the lower the economic development. Rule of law however has a positive, 
direct effect on economic development and the higher the prevalence of rule of law, the higher 
the economic development in the region. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Based on the empirical analyses and results obtained in this research study, foreign aid has been 
found to have a significant relationship with economic development in sub Saharan Africa and as 
such the null hypothesis is rejected. Also, the opinion that institutions do not have a significant 
effect in aid effectiveness and economic development is rejected. The technique of estimation 
used was the Generalized method of moments and this method was adopted to overcome the 
endogeneity issues perceived among the variables. Based on the results given in chapter 4, it is 
recommended that for foreign aid to be very effective in ensuring economic development in sub 
Saharan Africa, institutions are to be more strengthened as they have important role to play in aid 
effectiveness and economic development. This is in line with the different literatures including 
that of Farah Abuzeid, Burnside and Dollar (2000), Reuveny and Lee (2003) that the 
improvement of institutions is very important for aid effectiveness in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
This research study set to find out if there is a significant relationship existing between foreign 
aid and economic development in sub Saharan Africa over the periods 1996 to 2010 by 
analyzing countries across time and space, that is, cross sectional data. It also sought to examine 
the role of institutions on aid effectiveness and economic development 
In order to achieve these objectives, the new growth theory was the main theoretical framework 
including some other theories such as the Harrod-Domar model, the two gap models, and three 
gap model and so on. In the model, Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita was used as a proxy 
for economic development. The explanatory variables used include Gross fixed capital 
formation, Labour, Foreign aid, institutions (as proxied by Rule of law and control of corruption) 
and Human capital (as proxied by tertiary enrolment rate). 
After a review of relevant literature and the necessary empirical analyses (both descriptive and 
econometric), an inelastic relationship was observed between foreign aid and economic 
development in sub Saharan Africa and the reason for this can be attributed to poor institutions in 
Sub Saharan Africa which limits the effectiveness of aid as stated in chapter two. Also, though 
all the explanatory variables were significant asides labour, not all positively influence economic 
development. The explanatory variables that had an inelastic relationship economic development 
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includes foreign aid and human capital. A reason for the inverse relationship between control of 
corruption and economic development in developing countries such as the ones in sub Saharan 
Africa is explained by Welfe and Welfe (2009) in which it is discovered that corruption could 
actually lead to economic development. Corruption is seen to influence economic development 
though not always in an adverse way. In fact, corruption may serve to replace weak institutions 
functionality found in sub Saharan Africa and indeed increase production in such countries by 
avoiding inefficient and cumbersome government regulations. Corruption is also seen to be more 
beneficial to economic development when economic freedom is low (Heckellman and Powell, 
2008). Also, according to Lui (1996), corruption is seen to reestablish price mechanism and to 
help allocate resources in distorted, heavily regulated markets. Other persons including Friedrich 
(1972), Nye(1967), Huntington(1968) concluded that corruption actually facilitates the wheels of 
business and commerce thus aiding economic growth and investment (Selcuk Akcay). 
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
In the words of Burnside and Dollar, Farah Abuzeid, it is generally believed that developing 
countries are able to enhance their growth and development prospects through foreign aid. For 
the purpose of this research work, the following recommendations are given: 
1) The inelastic relationship between foreign aid and economic development in sub Saharan 
Africa has a lot of implications for sub Saharan Africa economic policy. It implies that 
aid has not produced optimal results as is expected. Aid as such has not been effective 
and this point to the fact that there are other factors which influences aid effectiveness. 
According to Farah Abuzeid, aid is effective in the presence of strong, reliable 
institutions. This evidence is further backed up by Todd Moss who stated that 
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institutional development is an independent variable thought to affect aid efficiency. 
Therefore, the government of countries in this region should ensure that policies are made 
to build and strengthen institutions so that aid can be more effective. 
2) Institutions actually have a role to play in aid effectiveness and in economic development 
in sub Saharan Africa. This is in line with the opinion of Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
Hall and Jones. Attention should therefore be devoted to the subject matter of institutions 
in influencing aid effectiveness and economic performance in sub Saharan Africa. 
3) There are different ways to improve aid effectiveness asides strengthening institutions 
according to the Paris Declaration and they include: maximization of donors’ 
coordination and harmonization, improving aid transparency and mutual accountability of 
donors and recipients. 
4) There was a significant but inelastic relationship between Human capital and economic 
development. According to Adeoye (2012), what are needed for Africa to develop is not 
necessarily assistance funds. There is a need for responsibility to invest in self sustained 
development projects. The first indicator of development according to Adeoye (2012) is 
Human capacity building. Thus, more attention should be given to Human Capital 
development as an indicator of economic development. 
5) There was also a significant but inverse relationship between control of corruption and 
economic development. There have been several reasons accorded to this result as given 
by Welfe and Welfe (2009), Nye (1967), Friedrich (1972) and so on. Though, sometimes 
Corruption is good for economic development especially in developing countries, it 
should not exceed a particular point lest it becomes harmful. 
5.3 Conclusion 
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This research work examined the effectiveness of foreign aid and the role of institutions in sub 
Saharan Africa region and this area can be enhanced if the recommendations discussed in the 
study are carried out. 
5.4 Limitations to Study 
The main limitation of this study was mostly data related. There was also paucity of data for 
some variables especially human capital for some countries also. Another limitation was error in 
estimation which is a characteristic of secondary data. 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Study 
An interesting variant to this study would an in-depth review of foreign aid effectiveness within 
longer time period. This would be able to give more scope and information about foreign aid 
effectiveness. Also, other measures of institutions asides rule of law and control of corruption 
can be looked into. 
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APPENDIX 
YEAR
S 
COUNTR
Y 
I
D RGDPK AID 
RO
L 
CO
C GFCF LAB HUKP 
1996 Angola 1 5.98E+0 6.29E+0 - - 2.61E+0 4.67E+0  
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2 8 1.63 1.16 9 6 
1997 Angola 1 
6.28E+0
2 
5.35E+0
8   
1.95E+0
9 
4.79E+0
6  
1998 Angola 1 
6.53E+0
2 
5.06E+0
8 
-
1.70 
-
1.32 
2.29E+0
9 
4.91E+0
6 
6.28E-
01 
1999 Angola 1 
6.56E+0
2 
5.81E+0
8   
1.77E+0
9 
5.04E+0
6 
5.95E-
01 
2000 Angola 1 
6.56E+0
2 
4.74E+0
8 
-
1.63 
-
1.52 
1.37E+0
9 
5.20E+0
6  
2001 Angola 1 
6.54E+0
2 
4.59E+0
8   
1.20E+0
9 
5.37E+0
6  
2002 Angola 1 
7.24E+0
2 
6.09E+0
8 
-
1.61 
-
1.14 
1.44E+0
9 
5.52E+0
6 
8.62E-
01 
2003 Angola 1 
7.22E+0
2 
6.31E+0
8 
-
1.53 
-
1.30 
1.77E+0
9 
5.72E+0
6 
3.19E+0
0 
2004 Angola 1 
7.76E+0
2 
1.36E+0
9 
-
1.46 
-
1.28 
1.80E+0
9 
5.90E+0
6 
2.39E+0
0 
2005 Angola 1 
8.88E+0
2 
4.77E+0
8 
-
1.44 
-
1.33 
2.52E+0
9 
6.06E+0
6 
2.96E+0
0 
2006 Angola 1 
1.04E+0
3 
1.84E+0
8 
-
1.30 
-
1.23 
6.42E+0
9 
6.23E+0
6 
2.90E+0
0 
2007 Angola 1 
1.24E+0
3 
2.57E+0
8 
-
1.40 
-
1.32 
8.16E+0
9 
6.40E+0
6  
2008 Angola 1 
1.37E+0
3 
3.59E+0
8 
-
1.39 
-
1.28 
1.36E+1
0 
6.59E+0
6  
2009 Angola 1 
1.36E+0
3 
2.44E+0
8 
-
1.22 
-
1.44 
1.15E+1
0 
6.84E+0
6  
2010 Angola 1 
1.37E+0
3 
2.38E+0
8 
-
1.24 
-
1.34 
1.04E+1
0 
7.11E+0
6 
3.71E+0
0 
1996 Benin 2 
3.15E+0
2 
3.67E+0
8 
-
0.19 
-
0.93 
1.62E+0
8 
2.30E+0
6 
2.15E+0
0 
1997 Benin 2 
3.25E+0
2 
3.14E+0
8   
1.76E+0
8 
2.36E+0
6 
2.61E+0
0 
1998 Benin 2 
3.31E+0
2 
2.91E+0
8 
-
0.14 
-
0.60 
3.46E+0
8 
2.42E+0
6  
1999 Benin 2 
3.37E+0
2 
3.01E+0
8   
3.73E+0
8 
2.49E+0
6 
3.41E+0
0 
2000 Benin 2 
3.46E+0
2 
3.90E+0
8 
-
0.27 
-
0.49 
4.27E+0
8 
2.56E+0
6 
3.89E+0
0 
2001 Benin 2 
3.52E+0
2 
4.45E+0
8   
4.54E+0
8 
2.64E+0
6 
4.73E+0
0 
2002 Benin 2 
3.57E+0
2 
3.36E+0
8 
-
0.34 
-
0.79 
4.47E+0
8 
2.73E+0
6 
5.60E+0
0 
2003 Benin 2 
3.59E+0
2 
3.86E+0
8 
-
0.52 
-
0.57 
4.95E+0
8 
2.83E+0
6 
6.20E+0
0 
2004 Benin 2 3.58E+0 4.66E+0 - - 4.95E+0 2.94E+0 6.27E+0
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2 8 0.59 0.49 8 6 0 
2005 Benin 2 
3.57E+0
2 
4.02E+0
8 
-
0.59 
-
0.97 
5.52E+0
8 
3.05E+0
6 
6.19E+0
0 
2006 Benin 2 
3.61E+0
2 
4.50E+0
8 
-
0.57 
-
0.61  
3.16E+0
6 
6.03E+0
0 
2007 Benin 2 
3.66E+0
2 
4.87E+0
8 
-
0.55 
-
0.47  
3.27E+0
6  
2008 Benin 2 
3.74E+0
2 
6.21E+0
8 
-
0.57 
-
0.53  
3.39E+0
6  
2009 Benin 2 
3.77E+0
2 
6.74E+0
8 
-
0.70 
-
0.70  
3.50E+0
6 
1.06E+0
1 
2010 Benin 2 
3.77E+0
2 
6.89E+0
8 
-
0.73 
-
0.76  
3.62E+0
6  
1996 Botswana 3 
2.56E+0
3 
9.50E+0
7 0.50 0.59 
1.01E+0
9 
7.15E+0
5 
5.51E+0
0 
1997 Botswana 3 
2.76E+0
3 
1.75E+0
8   
1.13E+0
9 
7.41E+0
5  
1998 Botswana 3 
2.99E+0
3 
1.49E+0
8 0.58 0.71 
1.33E+0
9 
7.67E+0
5  
1999 Botswana 3 
3.08E+0
3 
8.49E+0
7   
1.43E+0
9 
7.93E+0
5 
5.25E+0
0 
2000 Botswana 3 
3.20E+0
3 
4.63E+0
7 0.53 0.67 
1.46E+0
9 
8.17E+0
5 
5.64E+0
0 
2001 Botswana 3 
3.27E+0
3 
4.58E+0
7   
1.52E+0
9 
8.39E+0
5 
6.07E+0
0 
2002 Botswana 3 
3.52E+0
3 
5.05E+0
7 0.50 0.61 
1.60E+0
9 
8.61E+0
5 
6.57E+0
0 
2003 Botswana 3 
3.69E+0
3 
3.51E+0
7 0.67 1.25 
1.64E+0
9 
8.81E+0
5 
7.56E+0
0 
2004 Botswana 3 
3.87E+0
3 
5.90E+0
7 0.64 0.88 
1.71E+0
9 
9.02E+0
5 
7.44E+0
0 
2005 Botswana 3 
3.88E+0
3 
5.52E+0
7 0.60 1.14 
1.63E+0
9 
9.24E+0
5 
7.29E+0
0 
2006 Botswana 3 
4.03E+0
3 
7.62E+0
7 0.57 0.89 
1.58E+0
9 
9.47E+0
5 
7.44E+0
0 
2007 Botswana 3 
4.16E+0
3 
1.10E+0
8 0.61 0.94 
1.87E+0
9 
9.69E+0
5  
2008 Botswana 3 
4.22E+0
3 
6.94E+0
8 0.65 0.99 
2.14E+0
9 
9.92E+0
5  
2009 Botswana 3 
3.97E+0
3 
2.81E+0
8 0.66 0.90 
2.24E+0
9 
1.02E+0
6  
2010 Botswana 3 
4.19E+0
3 
1.56E+0
8 0.67 0.98 
2.61E+0
9 
1.04E+0
6  
1996 
Burkina 
faso 4 
1.90E+0
2 
5.46E+0
8 
-
1.03 0.22 
4.54E+0
8 
4.86E+0
6 
1.01E+0
0 
1997 Burkina 4 1.97E+0 5.36E+0   5.22E+0 5.01E+0 9.33E-
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faso 2 8 8 6 01 
1998 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.05E+0
2 
5.83E+0
8 
-
0.84 
-
0.24 
5.27E+0
8 
5.17E+0
6  
1999 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.14E+0
2 
5.85E+0
8   
5.05E+0
8 
5.33E+0
6 
9.12E-
01 
2000 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.12E+0
2 
3.20E+0
8 
-
0.67 
-
0.14 
4.88E+0
8 
5.50E+0
6 
9.87E-
01 
2001 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.20E+0
2 
6.57E+0
8   
4.17E+0
8 
5.67E+0
6 
1.06E+0
0 
2002 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.24E+0
2 
6.82E+0
8 
-
0.68 
-
0.02 
5.14E+0
8 
5.85E+0
6 
1.29E+0
0 
2003 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.35E+0
2 
7.09E+0
8 
-
0.56 
-
0.03 
6.15E+0
8 
6.04E+0
6 
1.47E+0
0 
2004 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.39E+0
2 
7.61E+0
8 
-
0.56 
-
0.15 
6.81E+0
8 
6.23E+0
6  
2005 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.52E+0
2 
8.04E+0
8 
-
0.51 
-
0.09  
6.43E+0
6 
2.14E+0
0 
2006 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.61E+0
2 
1.01E+0
9 
-
0.41 
-
0.33  
6.64E+0
6 
2.27E+0
0 
2007 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.63E+0
2 
9.78E+0
8 
-
0.39 
-
0.35  
6.85E+0
6 
2.43E+0
0 
2008 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.70E+0
2 
9.65E+0
8 
-
0.33 
-
0.33  
7.08E+0
6 
2.96E+0
0 
2009 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.70E+0
2 
1.08E+0
9 
-
0.22 
-
0.37  
7.31E+0
6 
3.29E+0
0 
2010 
Burkina 
faso 4 
2.83E+0
2 
1.06E+0
9 
-
0.21 
-
0.38  
7.54E+0
6 
3.33E+0
0 
1996 Burundi 5 
1.34E+0
2 
1.48E+0
8 
-
1.72 
-
1.39 
7.27E+0
7 
2.88E+0
6  
1997 Burundi 5 
1.31E+0
2 
8.37E+0
7   
5.15E+0
7 
2.86E+0
6  
1998 Burundi 5 
1.37E+0
2 
1.04E+0
8 
-
1.48 
-
1.15 
5.34E+0
7 
2.84E+0
6 
8.66E-
01 
1999 Burundi 5 
1.34E+0
2 
1.12E+0
8   
4.76E+0
7 
2.87E+0
6 
9.82E-
01 
2000 Burundi 5 
1.31E+0
2 
1.50E+0
8 
-
1.56 
-
1.01 
3.53E+0
7 
2.92E+0
6 
1.17E+0
0 
2001 Burundi 5 
1.31E+0
2 
2.36E+0
8   
3.76E+0
7 
2.99E+0
6 
1.15E+0
0 
2002 Burundi 5 
1.34E+0
2 
2.64E+0
8 
-
1.38 
-
0.94 
3.59E+0
7 
3.10E+0
6 
1.82E+0
0 
2003 Burundi 5 
1.29E+0
2 
2.96E+0
8 
-
1.54 
-
1.05 
6.31E+0
7 
3.23E+0
6 
1.93E+0
0 
2004 Burundi 5 
1.31E+0
2 
4.29E+0
8 
-
1.60 
-
0.97 
9.29E+0
7 
3.37E+0
6 
2.38E+0
0 
2005 Burundi 5 1.28E+0 4.16E+0 - - 9.68E+0 3.52E+0 2.41E+0
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2 8 1.19 0.90 7 6 0 
2006 Burundi 5 
1.31E+0
2 
4.79E+0
8 
-
0.98 
-
1.07 
1.75E+0
8 
3.68E+0
6 
2.41E+0
0 
2007 Burundi 5 
1.33E+0
2 
4.88E+0
8 
-
1.09 
-
1.12 
2.40E+0
8 
3.84E+0
6 
2.45E+0
0 
2008 Burundi 5 
1.36E+0
2 
5.05E+0
8 
-
1.04 
-
1.02 
3.03E+0
8 
4.01E+0
6 
2.63E+0
0 
2009 Burundi 5 
1.37E+0
2 
5.58E+0
8 
-
1.16 
-
1.07 
3.42E+0
8 
4.17E+0
6 
2.80E+0
0 
2010 Burundi 5 
1.38E+0
2 
6.30E+0
8 
-
1.19 
-
1.06 
3.65E+0
8 
4.31E+0
6 
3.25E+0
0 
1996 Cameroon 6 
5.87E+0
2 
5.29E+0
8  
-
1.16 
1.21E+0
9 
5.51E+0
6  
1997 Cameroon 6 
6.03E+0
2 
7.17E+0
8   
1.32E+0
9 
5.67E+0
6  
1998 Cameroon 6 
6.18E+0
2 
7.31E+0
8  
-
1.04 
1.49E+0
9 
5.84E+0
6  
1999 Cameroon 6 
6.31E+0
2 
6.29E+0
8   
1.60E+0
9 
6.02E+0
6 
4.74E+0
0 
2000 Cameroon 6 
6.43E+0
2 
5.97E+0
8  
-
1.06 
1.61E+0
9 
6.19E+0
6 
4.49E+0
0 
2001 Cameroon 6 
6.56E+0
2 
7.49E+0
8   
2.02E+0
9 
6.38E+0
6 
4.52E+0
0 
2002 Cameroon 6 
6.67E+0
2 
9.54E+0
8 
-
1.25 
-
1.09 
2.10E+0
9 
6.56E+0
6 
4.96E+0
0 
2003 Cameroon 6 
6.79E+0
2 
1.14E+0
9 
-
1.09 
-
0.86 
1.98E+0
9 
6.75E+0
6 
5.03E+0
0 
2004 Cameroon 6 
6.88E+0
2 
9.26E+0
8 
-
1.20 
-
1.08 
2.20E+0
9 
6.94E+0
6 
5.03E+0
0 
2005 Cameroon 6 
6.89E+0
2 
4.75E+0
8 
-
1.18 
-
1.14 
2.21E+0
9 
7.15E+0
6 
5.82E+0
0 
2006 Cameroon 6 
6.95E+0
2 
1.91E+0
9 
-
1.12 
-
1.01 
2.21E+0
9 
7.35E+0
6 
6.82E+0
0 
2007 Cameroon 6 
7.04E+0
2 
1.94E+0
9 
-
1.16 
-
0.94 
2.36E+0
9 
7.55E+0
6 
7.33E+0
0 
2008 Cameroon 6 
7.08E+0
2 
5.27E+0
8 
-
1.09 
-
0.93  
7.77E+0
6 
8.03E+0
0 
2009 Cameroon 6 
7.07E+0
2 
6.42E+0
8 
-
1.11 
-
0.93  
7.99E+0
6 
9.27E+0
0 
2010 Cameroon 6 
7.14E+0
2 
5.41E+0
8 
-
1.05 
-
0.99  
8.21E+0
6 
1.15E+0
1 
 
1996 Capeverde 7 9.29E+02 1.54E+08   2.57E+07 1.43E+05  
1997 Capeverde 7 9.58E+02 1.62E+08   2.47E+07 1.47E+05  
1998 Capeverde 7 1.01E+03 1.93E+08  - 2.39E+07 1.52E+05  
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0.32 
1999 Capeverde 7 1.08E+03 2.00E+08   2.74E+07 1.57E+05 1.75E+00 
2000 Capeverde 7 1.23E+03 1.52E+08  0.13 1.64E+08 1.63E+05 1.91E+00 
2001 Capeverde 7 1.29E+03 1.28E+08   1.79E+08 1.68E+05 1.63E+00 
2002 Capeverde 7 1.33E+03 1.42E+08 0.19 0.38 2.16E+08 1.74E+05 3.94E+00 
2003 Capeverde 7 1.37E+03 1.94E+08 0.14 0.29 2.15E+08 1.81E+05 4.63E+00 
2004 Capeverde 7 1.41E+03 1.72E+08 0.27 0.27 2.67E+08 1.87E+05 6.10E+00 
2005 Capeverde 7 1.48E+03 1.89E+08 0.31 0.34 2.54E+08 1.93E+05 7.58E+00 
2006 Capeverde 7 1.61E+03 1.56E+08 0.57 0.63 3.08E+08 2.00E+05 8.57E+00 
2007 Capeverde 7 1.74E+03 1.68E+08 0.56 0.79 4.24E+08 2.06E+05 9.70E+00 
2008 Capeverde 7 1.83E+03 2.12E+08 0.51 0.78 4.92E+08 2.12E+05 1.20E+01 
2009 Capeverde 7 1.88E+03 1.92E+08 0.48 0.75 4.52E+08 2.18E+05 1.51E+01 
2010 Capeverde 7 1.96E+03 3.28E+08 0.42 0.78 4.96E+08 2.25E+05 1.78E+01 
1996 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.41E+02 2.11E+08  
-
1.39 4.61E+07 1.54E+06  
1997 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.48E+02 1.25E+08   9.84E+07 1.58E+06  
1998 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.54E+02 1.71E+08  
-
1.00 1.43E+08 1.61E+06  
1999 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.58E+02 1.69E+08   1.53E+08 1.65E+06 1.90E+00 
2000 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.59E+02 1.10E+08  
-
1.19 9.13E+07 1.68E+06 1.87E+00 
2001 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.55E+02 1.20E+08   8.09E+07 1.71E+06  
2002 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.50E+02 8.98E+07 
-
1.13 
-
1.11 9.33E+07 1.74E+06  
2003 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.27E+02 6.68E+07 
-
1.57 
-
1.23 6.96E+07 1.77E+06  
2004 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.26E+02 1.29E+08 
-
1.63 
-
1.33 7.82E+07 1.81E+06 1.71E+00 
2005 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.27E+02 1.02E+08 
-
1.48 
-
1.21 1.20E+08 1.84E+06 1.64E+00 
2006 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.32E+02 1.49E+08 
-
1.49 
-
1.00 1.37E+08 1.88E+06 1.13E+00 
2007 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.36E+02 1.79E+08 
-
1.52 
-
0.97 1.52E+08 1.92E+06  
2008 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.37E+02 2.51E+08 
-
1.43 
-
0.98 2.31E+08 1.97E+06 2.28E+00 
2009 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.36E+02 2.40E+08 
-
1.32 
-
0.91 2.13E+08 2.01E+06 2.45E+00 
2010 
Cent.Africa 
republic 8 2.40E+02 2.61E+08 
-
1.30 
-
0.84  2.06E+06 2.57E+00 
1996 chad 9 1.72E+02 3.82E+08  
-
0.93 1.86E+08 2.83E+06 5.47E-01 
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1997 chad 9 1.77E+02 3.23E+08   2.15E+08 2.92E+06 5.80E-01 
1998 chad 9 1.83E+02 2.50E+08  
-
0.94 1.99E+08 3.01E+06 7.04E-01 
1999 chad 9 1.76E+02 2.71E+08   2.37E+08 3.11E+06  
2000 chad 9 1.68E+02 2.07E+08  
-
0.82 2.90E+08 3.22E+06 8.16E-01 
2001 chad 9 1.82E+02 3.07E+08   5.66E+08 3.33E+06 8.11E-01 
2002 chad 9 1.90E+02 3.49E+08 
-
1.00 
-
0.94 1.00E+09 3.45E+06  
2003 chad 9 2.10E+02 3.28E+08 
-
1.31 
-
1.26 9.35E+08 3.58E+06 9.10E-01 
2004 chad 9 2.71E+02 3.94E+08 
-
1.34 
-
1.28 5.85E+08 3.70E+06 1.19E+00 
2005 chad 9 3.08E+02 4.43E+08 
-
1.45 
-
1.43 4.23E+08 3.83E+06 1.41E+00 
2006 chad 9 3.00E+02 3.24E+08 
-
1.48 
-
1.27 3.43E+08 3.95E+06  
2007 chad 9 2.92E+02 3.69E+08 
-
1.48 
-
1.30 8.06E+08 4.06E+06  
2008 chad 9 2.83E+02 4.05E+08 
-
1.57 
-
1.45 1.19E+09 4.18E+06 1.97E+00 
2009 chad 9 2.73E+02 5.57E+08 
-
1.51 
-
1.35 2.00E+09 4.30E+06 2.06E+00 
2010 chad 9 3.00E+02 4.86E+08 
-
1.50 
-
1.33 2.24E+09 4.42E+06 2.17E+00 
 
1996 Comoros 10 3.66E+02 5.01E+07  
-
0.93 3.14E+07 1.56E+05 7.61E-01 
1997 Comoros 10 3.71E+02 4.25E+07   2.84E+07 1.61E+05  
1998 Comoros 10 3.66E+02 5.73E+07  
-
1.31 3.17E+07 1.67E+05  
1999 Comoros 10 3.63E+02 3.17E+07   2.65E+07 1.73E+05 1.22E+00 
2000 Comoros 10 3.59E+02 3.12E+07  
-
1.12 2.04E+07 1.80E+05 1.28E+00 
2001 Comoros 10 3.61E+02 4.48E+07   2.21E+07 1.85E+05  
2002 Comoros 10 3.66E+02 4.23E+07 
-
1.04 
-
0.87 2.77E+07 1.91E+05  
2003 Comoros 10 3.65E+02 3.20E+07 
-
0.97 
-
0.84 3.34E+07 1.98E+05 2.66E+00 
2004 Comoros 10 3.55E+02 3.10E+07 
-
1.06 
-
0.84 3.39E+07 2.04E+05 2.68E+00 
2005 Comoros 10 3.60E+02 2.65E+07 
-
1.03 
-
0.82 3.60E+07 2.10E+05  
2006 Comoros 10 3.55E+02 3.59E+07 
-
0.98 
-
0.64 3.88E+07 2.16E+05  
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2007 Comoros 10 3.47E+02 4.56E+07 
-
1.03 
-
0.65 5.19E+07 2.23E+05 3.86E+00 
2008 Comoros 10 3.41E+02 3.94E+07 
-
1.07 
-
0.75 7.57E+07 2.29E+05  
2009 Comoros 10 3.38E+02 4.93E+07 
-
1.15 
-
0.78 6.64E+07 2.36E+05 7.08E+00 
2010 Comoros 10 3.36E+02 6.72E+07 
-
1.06 
-
0.74  2.42E+05 7.92E+00 
1996 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 1.15E+02 2.16E+08  
-
2.06 1.74E+08 1.69E+07  
1997 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 1.06E+02 2.30E+08   1.54E+08 1.73E+07  
1998 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 1.02E+02 1.85E+08  
-
1.90 1.53E+08 1.77E+07  
1999 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 9.55E+01 1.96E+08   1.63E+08 1.81E+07 1.40E+00 
2000 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 8.68E+01 2.86E+08  
-
1.57 1.49E+08 1.85E+07  
2001 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 8.27E+01 3.98E+08   2.43E+08 1.90E+07  
2002 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 8.31E+01 1.75E+09 
-
1.69 
-
1.26 2.54E+08 1.96E+07  
2003 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 8.53E+01 6.94E+09 
-
1.73 
-
1.41 6.94E+08 2.02E+07  
2004 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 8.83E+01 2.20E+09 
-
1.70 
-
1.43 8.33E+08 2.08E+07  
2005 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 9.24E+01 2.16E+09 
-
1.57 
-
1.43 1.01E+09 2.15E+07  
2006 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 9.48E+01 2.40E+09 
-
1.61 
-
1.48 1.11E+09 2.22E+07 4.19E+00 
2007 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 9.79E+01 1.37E+09 
-
1.60 
-
1.31 1.95E+09 2.29E+07 4.19E+00 
2008 
Congo, 
Dem. 11 1.01E+02 1.70E+09 
-
1.56 
-
1.17 2.78E+09 2.37E+07 5.24E+00 
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Rep. 
2009 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 1.01E+02 2.37E+09 
-
1.63 
-
1.38 3.22E+09 2.45E+07 6.19E+00 
2010 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. 11 1.06E+02 3.54E+09 
-
1.61 
-
1.39  2.53E+07  
1996 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.06E+03 5.89E+08  
-
1.11 6.57E+08 1.09E+06  
1997 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.02E+03 3.91E+08   5.02E+08 1.13E+06  
1998 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.03E+03 9.22E+07  
-
1.13 4.74E+08 1.17E+06  
1999 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 9.79E+02 2.16E+08   6.26E+08 1.21E+06 3.67E+00 
2000 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.03E+03 5.21E+07  
-
0.96 6.73E+08 1.25E+06 5.20E+00 
2001 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.04E+03 1.14E+08   7.34E+08 1.29E+06 4.35E+00 
2002 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.06E+03 8.93E+07 
-
1.24 
-
0.87 6.81E+08 1.32E+06 3.87E+00 
2003 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.05E+03 8.88E+07 
-
1.18 
-
0.94 8.91E+08 1.36E+06 3.89E+00 
2004 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.06E+03 1.35E+08 
-
1.15 
-
0.84 1.02E+09 1.40E+06  
2005 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.11E+03 1.66E+09 
-
1.46 
-
1.02 1.20E+09 1.44E+06  
2006 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.15E+03 2.90E+08 
-
1.24 
-
1.05 1.64E+09 1.49E+06  
2007 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.10E+03 1.22E+08 
-
1.21 
-
1.09 1.80E+09 1.54E+06  
2008 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.13E+03 4.57E+08 
-
1.17 
-
1.13 2.14E+09 1.59E+06  
2009 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.18E+03 2.75E+08 
-
1.15 
-
1.21 2.13E+09 1.64E+06 6.47E+00 
2010 
Congo, 
Rep. 12 1.25E+03 1.31E+09 
-
1.15 
-
1.15 2.43E+09 1.69E+06 5.51E+00 
 
1996 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 6.37E+02 1.24E+09  0.20 1.39E+09 5.73E+06  
1997 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 6.56E+02 6.31E+08   1.51E+09 5.90E+06  
1998 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 6.71E+02 1.42E+09  
-
0.30 1.75E+09 6.07E+06  
1999 Cote 13 6.66E+02 6.50E+08   1.60E+09 6.24E+06 6.37E+00 
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d'Ivoire 
2000 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 6.28E+02 5.60E+08  
-
0.69 1.17E+09 6.39E+06 6.63E+00 
2001 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 6.17E+02 3.28E+08   1.03E+09 6.51E+06  
2002 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.98E+02 1.69E+09 
-
1.38 
-
0.82 1.14E+09 6.63E+06  
2003 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.79E+02 3.27E+08 
-
1.46 
-
0.98 9.80E+08 6.75E+06  
2004 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.80E+02 1.90E+08 
-
1.42 
-
1.22 1.00E+09 6.86E+06  
2005 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.78E+02 1.06E+08 
-
1.50 
-
1.24 1.01E+09 6.99E+06  
2006 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.72E+02 2.78E+08 
-
1.47 
-
1.18 1.62E+09 7.12E+06 8.56E+00 
2007 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.72E+02 1.82E+08 
-
1.50 
-
1.07 1.72E+09 7.27E+06 8.87E+00 
2008 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.75E+02 6.10E+08 
-
1.46 
-
1.09 2.37E+09 7.42E+06  
2009 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.86E+02 2.36E+09 
-
1.24 
-
1.10 2.62E+09 7.60E+06  
2010 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 13 5.88E+02 8.45E+08 
-
1.22 
-
1.16 3.16E+09 7.79E+06  
1996 Djibouti 14 8.39E+02 1.22E+08  
-
0.47 4.91E+07 1.76E+05 2.19E-01 
1997 Djibouti 14 8.06E+02 1.20E+08   5.14E+07 1.84E+05 2.64E-01 
1998 Djibouti 14 7.80E+02 1.15E+08  
-
0.73 6.55E+07 1.92E+05  
1999 Djibouti 14 7.71E+02 1.08E+08   4.73E+07 2.01E+05 2.68E-01 
2000 Djibouti 14 7.53E+02 1.08E+08  
-
0.95 4.85E+07 2.10E+05 2.80E-01 
2001 Djibouti 14 7.50E+02 9.59E+07   4.43E+07 2.17E+05 7.05E-01 
2002 Djibouti 14 7.54E+02 1.12E+08 
-
0.88 
-
0.71 5.80E+07 2.25E+05 1.00E+00 
2003 Djibouti 14 7.64E+02 1.02E+08 
-
0.85 
-
0.84 8.59E+07 2.32E+05 1.21E+00 
2004 Djibouti 14 7.79E+02 7.52E+07 
-
0.80 
-
0.51 1.33E+08 2.40E+05 1.47E+00 
2005 Djibouti 14 7.89E+02 8.56E+07 
-
0.91 
-
0.68 1.21E+08 2.48E+05 2.14E+00 
2006 Djibouti 14 8.12E+02 1.29E+08 
-
0.82 
-
0.62 1.98E+08 2.56E+05 2.36E+00 
2007 Djibouti 14 8.37E+02 1.15E+08 
-
0.70 
-
0.47  2.65E+05 2.61E+00 
2008 Djibouti 14 8.69E+02 1.36E+08 
-
0.59 
-
0.19  2.74E+05  
76 
 
2009 Djibouti 14 8.95E+02 1.66E+08 
-
0.65 
-
0.28  2.83E+05 3.45E+00 
2010 Djibouti 14  1.32E+08 
-
0.72 
-
0.32  2.92E+05  
1996 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 8.19E+02 4.30E+07 
-
1.17 
-
1.25 2.94E+08 2.30E+05  
1997 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 1.36E+03 3.81E+07   3.27E+08 2.37E+05  
1998 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 1.60E+03 3.52E+07 
-
1.44 
-
1.21 4.17E+08 2.44E+05  
1999 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 2.19E+03 3.18E+07    2.51E+05  
2000 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 2.41E+03 3.87E+07 
-
1.30 
-
1.53 7.69E+08 2.60E+05 3.29E+00 
2001 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 3.78E+03 2.47E+07   1.25E+09 2.70E+05  
2002 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 4.38E+03 3.33E+07 
-
1.39 
-
1.34 6.95E+08 2.80E+05  
2003 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 4.83E+03 2.87E+07 
-
1.35 
-
1.55 1.23E+09 2.91E+05  
2004 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 6.47E+03 3.53E+07 
-
1.45 
-
1.71 2.12E+09 3.02E+05  
2005 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 6.89E+03 4.47E+07 
-
1.43 
-
1.61 3.09E+09 3.13E+05  
2006 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 6.77E+03 2.94E+07 
-
1.35 
-
1.53 3.01E+09 3.24E+05  
2007 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 8.00E+03 3.15E+07 
-
1.28 
-
1.54 4.19E+09 3.35E+05  
2008 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 8.60E+03 3.02E+07 
-
1.24 
-
1.51 5.23E+09 3.46E+05  
2009 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 8.85E+03 3.04E+07 
-
1.24 
-
1.50 7.36E+09 3.57E+05  
2010 
Equatorial 
Guinea 15 8.54E+03 8.47E+07 
-
1.26 
-
1.50  3.69E+05  
 
1996 Eritrea 16 2.03E+02 2.19E+08 
-
0.38 0.44 1.34E+08 1.40E+06 8.16E-01 
1997 Eritrea 16 2.15E+02 1.79E+08   1.61E+08 1.44E+06  
1998 Eritrea 16 2.13E+02 2.44E+08 
-
0.23 0.85 1.79E+08 1.50E+06 7.78E-01 
1999 Eritrea 16 2.06E+02 2.23E+08   1.88E+08 1.57E+06 9.46E-01 
2000 Eritrea 16 1.73E+02 2.75E+08 
-
0.47 0.61 1.51E+08 1.66E+06 9.58E-01 
2001 Eritrea 16 2.01E+02 4.57E+08   1.47E+08 1.75E+06 1.26E+00 
2002 Eritrea 16 1.99E+02 3.36E+08 - 0.06 1.51E+08 1.86E+06 1.25E+00 
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0.39 
2003 Eritrea 16 1.86E+02 4.08E+08 
-
0.51 
-
0.07 1.18E+08 1.97E+06 1.29E+00 
2004 Eritrea 16 1.81E+02 3.15E+08 
-
0.69 
-
0.15 1.16E+08 2.08E+06 1.02E+00 
2005 Eritrea 16 1.79E+02 3.99E+08 
-
0.84 
-
0.21 1.43E+08 2.18E+06  
2006 Eritrea 16 1.71E+02 1.42E+08 
-
1.08 
-
0.25 1.41E+08 2.27E+06  
2007 Eritrea 16 1.68E+02 1.63E+08 
-
1.21 
-
0.50 1.41E+08 2.36E+06  
2008 Eritrea 16 1.47E+02 1.41E+08 
-
1.22 
-
0.32  2.44E+06  
2009 Eritrea 16 1.48E+02 1.45E+08 
-
1.25 
-
0.41  2.52E+06 1.98E+00 
2010 Eritrea 16 1.47E+02 1.61E+08 
-
1.29 
-
0.47  2.60E+06 1.99E+00 
1996 Ethiopia 17 1.25E+02 1.07E+09 
-
0.91 
-
1.15 1.24E+09 2.57E+07 6.94E-01 
1997 Ethiopia 17 1.26E+02 8.29E+08   1.65E+09 2.64E+07 8.15E-01 
1998 Ethiopia 17 1.18E+02 9.66E+08 
-
0.79 
-
0.69 1.67E+09 2.72E+07 8.58E-01 
1999 Ethiopia 17 1.21E+02 9.30E+08   1.74E+09 2.79E+07 9.69E-01 
2000 Ethiopia 17 1.25E+02 1.04E+09 
-
0.87 
-
0.49 1.66E+09 2.90E+07 1.22E+00 
2001 Ethiopia 17 1.32E+02 1.70E+09   1.84E+09 3.01E+07 1.53E+00 
2002 Ethiopia 17 1.30E+02 1.94E+09 
-
0.91 
-
0.73 2.07E+09 3.12E+07 1.73E+00 
2003 Ethiopia 17 1.24E+02 2.05E+09 
-
0.80 
-
0.68 1.87E+09 3.24E+07 2.43E+00 
2004 Ethiopia 17 1.38E+02 2.12E+09 
-
0.81 
-
0.72 2.32E+09 3.36E+07 2.73E+00 
2005 Ethiopia 17 1.50E+02 2.19E+09 
-
0.86 
-
0.76 2.35E+09 3.49E+07 2.92E+00 
2006 Ethiopia 17 1.63E+02 2.24E+09 
-
0.61 
-
0.62 2.78E+09 3.60E+07 2.65E+00 
2007 Ethiopia 17 1.78E+02 2.57E+09 
-
0.59 
-
0.60 3.52E+09 3.71E+07 3.61E+00 
2008 Ethiopia 17 1.92E+02 3.24E+09 
-
0.65 
-
0.67 3.46E+09 3.83E+07 3.60E+00 
2009 Ethiopia 17 2.05E+02 3.85E+09 
-
0.78 
-
0.74 4.68E+09 3.95E+07 4.19E+00 
2010 Ethiopia 17 2.21E+02 3.53E+09 
-
0.75 
-
0.73 4.39E+09 4.08E+07 5.46E+00 
1996 Gabon 18 4.64E+03 1.64E+08 
-
0.63 
-
1.02 1.22E+09 4.02E+05  
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1997 Gabon 18 4.77E+03 5.74E+07   1.67E+09 4.12E+05  
1998 Gabon 18 4.81E+03 6.52E+07 
-
0.34 
-
0.87 1.89E+09 4.22E+05  
1999 Gabon 18 4.28E+03 7.18E+07   1.21E+09 4.32E+05 7.05E+00 
2000 Gabon 18 4.10E+03 1.94E+07 
-
0.16 
-
0.50 1.11E+09 4.43E+05  
2001 Gabon 18 4.10E+03 1.23E+07   1.23E+09 4.55E+05  
2002 Gabon 18 4.00E+03 1.13E+08 
-
0.21 
-
0.42 1.14E+09 4.67E+05  
2003 Gabon 18 4.02E+03 
-
1.48E+07 
-
0.39 
-
0.47 1.13E+09 4.80E+05  
2004 Gabon 18 3.99E+03 4.72E+07 
-
0.51 
-
0.76 1.52E+09 4.92E+05  
2005 Gabon 18 4.03E+03 7.01E+07 
-
0.46 
-
0.54 1.41E+09 5.05E+05  
2006 Gabon 18 4.00E+03 3.27E+07 
-
0.70 
-
0.95 1.52E+09 5.21E+05  
2007 Gabon 18 4.14E+03 5.19E+07 
-
0.66 
-
1.02 1.64E+09 5.37E+05  
2008 Gabon 18 4.16E+03 5.88E+07 
-
0.60 
-
1.02 1.74E+09 5.53E+05  
2009 Gabon 18 4.03E+03 7.51E+07 
-
0.55 
-
0.93 1.89E+09 5.70E+05  
2010 Gabon 18 4.21E+03 1.04E+08 
-
0.51 
-
0.77 2.07E+09 5.88E+05  
 
1996 
Gambia, 
The 19 5.57E+02 4.70E+07 0.11 
-
0.44 3.68E+07 4.78E+05  
1997 
Gambia, 
The 19 5.68E+02 5.44E+07   3.02E+07 4.93E+05  
1998 
Gambia, 
The 19 5.72E+02 5.56E+07 0.04 
-
0.53 2.66E+07 5.10E+05  
1999 
Gambia, 
The 19 5.92E+02 4.78E+07   2.75E+07 5.26E+05 9.81E-01 
2000 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.06E+02 7.34E+07 
-
0.13 
-
0.41 3.59E+07 5.44E+05 9.62E-01 
2001 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.23E+02 8.05E+07   3.70E+07 5.61E+05  
2002 
Gambia, 
The 19 5.85E+02 9.52E+07 
-
0.29 
-
0.44 3.74E+07 5.81E+05  
2003 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.07E+02 8.01E+07 0.16 
-
0.33 3.74E+07 6.00E+05  
2004 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.31E+02 7.13E+07 
-
0.30 
-
0.59 4.00E+07 6.20E+05 1.06E+00 
2005 Gambia, 19 6.14E+02 6.94E+07 - - 3.57E+07 6.40E+05  
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The 0.28 0.71 
2006 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.17E+02 8.44E+07 
-
0.30 
-
0.74 4.08E+07 6.61E+05  
2007 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.36E+02 1.00E+08 
-
0.24 
-
0.77 3.32E+07 6.82E+05  
2008 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.57E+02 9.16E+07 
-
0.36 
-
0.75 2.70E+07 7.04E+05 4.12E+00 
2009 
Gambia, 
The 19 6.82E+02 1.28E+08 
-
0.45 
-
0.56 3.70E+07 7.28E+05  
2010 
Gambia, 
The 19 7.04E+02 1.20E+08 
-
0.51 
-
0.56 4.24E+07 7.51E+05  
1996 Ghana 20 2.42E+02 8.33E+08 
-
0.34 
-
0.22 1.41E+09   
1997 Ghana 20 2.46E+02 6.80E+08   1.64E+09   
1998 Ghana 20 2.51E+02 9.80E+08 
-
0.44 
-
0.17 1.67E+09   
1999 Ghana 20 2.56E+02 8.28E+08   1.58E+09   
2000 Ghana 20 2.60E+02 8.50E+08 0.09 
-
0.07 1.15E+09   
2001 Ghana 20 2.64E+02 9.80E+08   1.44E+09   
2002 Ghana 20 2.69E+02 9.95E+08 
-
0.02 
-
0.29 1.16E+09   
2003 Ghana 20 2.76E+02 1.25E+09 0.00 
-
0.24 1.75E+09   
2004 Ghana 20 2.85E+02 1.62E+09 
-
0.15 
-
0.23 2.52E+09   
2005 Ghana 20 2.94E+02 1.31E+09 
-
0.14 
-
0.36 3.11E+09  5.65E+00 
2006 Ghana 20 3.05E+02 1.37E+09 0.02 
-
0.01 4.41E+09  5.08E+00 
2007 Ghana 20 3.17E+02 1.18E+09 0.01 0.06 4.95E+09  6.32E+00 
2008 Ghana 20 3.36E+02 1.26E+09 
-
0.09 
-
0.03 6.12E+09  8.41E+00 
2009 Ghana 20 3.41E+02 1.59E+09 
-
0.09 0.06 5.12E+09  8.80E+00 
2010 Ghana 20 3.60E+02 1.69E+09 
-
0.07 0.08 7.01E+09   
1996 Guinea 21 3.41E+02 5.44E+08 
-
1.51 
-
0.46 6.03E+08 3.07E+06 1.16E+00 
1997 Guinea 21 3.49E+02 5.12E+08   6.36E+08 3.14E+06 1.19E+00 
1998 Guinea 21 3.60E+02 3.37E+08 
-
1.27 
-
0.73 5.93E+08 3.19E+06 1.21E+00 
1999 Guinea 21 3.71E+02 2.26E+08   6.28E+08 3.24E+06  
2000 Guinea 21 3.73E+02 4.43E+08 
-
1.42 
-
0.75 5.87E+08 3.29E+06  
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2001 Guinea 21 3.78E+02 3.71E+08   4.58E+08 3.35E+06  
2002 Guinea 21 3.86E+02 3.26E+08 
-
0.98 
-
0.52 4.34E+08 3.42E+06  
2003 Guinea 21 4.01E+02 3.27E+08 
-
1.11 
-
0.75 3.44E+08 3.47E+06 2.22E+00 
2004 Guinea 21 4.03E+02 2.28E+08 
-
1.24 
-
0.84 3.89E+08 3.54E+06 2.22E+00 
2005 Guinea 21 5.46E+02 1.91E+08 
-
1.36 
-
1.01 4.05E+08 3.62E+06 3.00E+00 
2006 Guinea 21 5.50E+02 2.36E+08 
-
1.42 
-
1.04 3.56E+08 3.70E+06 5.26E+00 
2007 Guinea 21 5.49E+02 3.19E+08 
-
1.46 
-
1.24 3.91E+08 3.79E+06 8.23E+00 
2008 Guinea 21 5.65E+02 2.10E+08 
-
1.54 
-
1.15 4.42E+08 3.87E+06 9.46E+00 
2009 Guinea 21 5.52E+02 2.18E+08 
-
1.54 
-
1.05 6.39E+08 3.98E+06  
2010 Guinea 21 5.50E+02  
-
1.50 
-
1.20 7.12E+08 4.09E+06  
 
1996 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 2.12E+02 2.45E+08 -2.03 -1.09 6.23E+07 4.43E+05  
1997 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 2.21E+02 1.79E+08   6.45E+07 4.53E+05  
1998 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.56E+02 1.38E+08 -2.07 -1.14 2.34E+07 4.76E+05  
1999 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.65E+02 7.88E+07   3.77E+07 4.88E+05 4.60E-01 
2000 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.74E+02 1.35E+08 -1.39 -0.97 2.43E+07 4.98E+05 4.19E-01 
2001 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.71E+02 1.04E+08   2.99E+07 5.12E+05 4.11E-01 
2002 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.56E+02 9.38E+07 -1.20 -0.85 1.96E+07 5.27E+05  
2003 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.52E+02 1.98E+08 -1.18 -1.07  5.42E+05  
2004 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.52E+02 9.02E+07 -1.18 -1.14  5.55E+05  
2005 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.54E+02 7.64E+07 -1.28 -1.10  5.68E+05 2.34E+00 
2006 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.54E+02 9.73E+07 -1.27 -0.98  5.83E+05 2.72E+00 
2007 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.56E+02 1.24E+08 -1.34 -1.14  5.99E+05  
2008 Guinea- 22 1.58E+02 1.28E+08 -1.42 -1.09  6.15E+05  
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Bissau 
2009 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.59E+02 1.43E+08 -1.36 -1.11  6.32E+05  
2010 
Guinea-
Bissau 22 1.61E+02 1.39E+08 -1.35 -1.07  6.48E+05  
1996 Kenya 23 4.21E+02 7.55E+08 -1.04 -1.03 1.77E+09 1.08E+07  
1997 Kenya 23 4.12E+02 6.21E+08   1.83E+09 1.11E+07  
1998 Kenya 23 4.15E+02 5.80E+08 -1.13 -1.02 1.97E+09 1.13E+07  
1999 Kenya 23 4.14E+02 4.18E+08   1.96E+09 1.16E+07  
2000 Kenya 23 4.06E+02 7.31E+08 -0.90 -0.95 2.12E+09 1.19E+07 2.75E+00 
2001 Kenya 23 4.11E+02 7.24E+08   2.38E+09 1.21E+07 2.82E+00 
2002 Kenya 23 4.02E+02 5.57E+08 -0.91 -0.99 2.24E+09 1.24E+07 2.82E+00 
2003 Kenya 23 4.03E+02 6.55E+08 -0.89 -0.83 2.06E+09 1.27E+07  
2004 Kenya 23 4.13E+02 7.67E+08 -0.86 -0.80 2.21E+09 1.30E+07 2.92E+00 
2005 Kenya 23 4.26E+02 8.56E+08 -0.90 -0.98 2.82E+09 1.32E+07 2.96E+00 
2006 Kenya 23 4.42E+02 1.04E+09 -0.88 -0.87 3.35E+09 1.37E+07  
2007 Kenya 23 4.61E+02 1.35E+09 -0.97 -0.91 3.80E+09 1.41E+07  
2008 Kenya 23 4.56E+02 1.33E+09 -1.02 -1.02 4.17E+09 1.45E+07  
2009 Kenya 23 4.56E+02 1.79E+09 -1.07 -1.07 4.16E+09 1.50E+07 4.03E+00 
2010 Kenya 23 4.69E+02 1.63E+09 -1.01 -0.93 4.46E+09 1.55E+07  
1996 Lesotho 24 3.52E+02 1.34E+08 0.00 -0.47 4.94E+08 7.78E+05 2.67E+00 
1997 Lesotho 24 3.57E+02 1.30E+08   4.24E+08 8.00E+05  
1998 Lesotho 24 3.70E+02 8.61E+07 0.11 -0.07 3.45E+08 8.21E+05  
1999 Lesotho 24 3.65E+02 4.39E+07   3.16E+08 8.42E+05 1.99E+00 
2000 Lesotho 24 3.80E+02 5.84E+07 0.04 -0.12 3.17E+08 8.48E+05 2.13E+00 
2001 Lesotho 24 3.91E+02 8.54E+07   2.94E+08 8.51E+05 2.30E+00 
2002 Lesotho 24 3.91E+02 1.13E+08 0.00 -0.18 2.69E+08 8.52E+05 2.26E+00 
2003 Lesotho 24 4.04E+02 9.99E+07 -0.01 -0.39 2.78E+08 8.51E+05 2.69E+00 
2004 Lesotho 24 4.09E+02 1.12E+08 -0.15 -0.19 2.12E+08 8.49E+05  
2005 Lesotho 24 4.17E+02 7.51E+07 -0.17 -0.04 1.77E+08 8.50E+05 3.34E+00 
2006 Lesotho 24 4.30E+02 7.62E+07 -0.26 -0.05 1.90E+08 8.52E+05 3.52E+00 
2007 Lesotho 24 4.46E+02 1.29E+08 -0.35 -0.12 2.12E+08 8.55E+05  
2008 Lesotho 24 4.66E+02 1.39E+08 -0.26 0.03 3.01E+08 8.60E+05  
2009 Lesotho 24 4.74E+02 1.21E+08 -0.23 0.16 2.98E+08 8.76E+05  
2010 Lesotho 24 4.96E+02 2.56E+08 -0.30 0.18 3.27E+08 8.94E+05  
 
1996 Liberia 25 
5.81E+0
1 
2.16E+0
8 
-
2.2
3 
-
1.7
4  
7.35E+0
5  
1997 Liberia 25 
1.12E+0
2 
1.09E+0
8    
7.91E+0
5  
1998 Liberia 25 
1.35E+0
2 
1.07E+0
8 
-
2.1
1 
-
1.7
3  
8.54E+0
5  
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1999 Liberia 25 
1.55E+0
2 
1.31E+0
8    
9.14E+0
5 
8.14E+0
0 
2000 Liberia 25 
1.86E+0
2 
9.92E+0
7 
-
2.1
2 
-
1.3
7 
3.97E+0
7 
9.64E+0
5 
1.91E+0
1 
2001 Liberia 25 
2.20E+0
2 
5.78E+0
7   
1.22E+0
7 
9.97E+0
5  
2002 Liberia 25 
2.84E+0
2 
7.97E+0
7 
-
1.8
6 
-
1.1
7 
1.60E+0
7 
1.02E+0
6  
2003 Liberia 25 
1.88E+0
2 
1.38E+0
8 
-
1.6
9 
-
1.2
2 
7.20E+0
6 
1.03E+0
6  
2004 Liberia 25 
1.76E+0
2 
2.48E+0
8 
-
1.7
1 
-
1.2
7 
1.35E+0
7 
1.06E+0
6  
2005 Liberia 25 
1.87E+0
2 
2.53E+0
8 
-
1.3
7 
-
1.0
4 
2.25E+0
7 
1.09E+0
6  
2006 Liberia 25 
1.97E+0
2 
2.88E+0
8 
-
0.8
7 
-
0.4
7 
3.11E+0
7 
1.14E+0
6  
2007 Liberia 25 
2.17E+0
2 
7.24E+0
8 
-
1.0
1 
-
0.3
3 
3.24E+0
7 
1.19E+0
6  
2008 Liberia 25 
2.28E+0
2 
1.21E+0
9 
-
1.1
9 
-
0.6
6 
2.72E+0
7 
1.26E+0
6  
2009 Liberia 25 
2.46E+0
2 
5.13E+0
8 
-
1.0
8 
-
0.5
4 
4.23E+0
7 
1.32E+0
6  
2010 Liberia 25 
2.61E+0
2 
1.42E+0
9 
-
1.0
1 
-
0.5
1 
7.18E+0
7 
1.37E+0
6  
1996 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.42E+0
2 
4.54E+0
8 
-
0.5
3 
0.2
1 
4.02E+0
8 
6.48E+0
6 
2.22E+0
0 
1997 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.43E+0
2 
1.21E+0
9   
4.25E+0
8 
6.68E+0
6 
2.01E+0
0 
1998 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.45E+0
2 
6.95E+0
8 
-
0.5
8 
-
0.5
5 
5.03E+0
8 
6.88E+0
6 
2.27E+0
0 
1999 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.49E+0
2 
5.05E+0
8   
5.10E+0
8 
7.08E+0
6 
2.19E+0
0 
2000 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.52E+0
2 
4.77E+0
8 
-
0.2
-
0.1
5.83E+0
8 
7.30E+0
6 
2.26E+0
0 
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5 3 
2001 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.59E+0
2 
5.76E+0
8   
7.17E+0
8 
7.53E+0
6 
2.15E+0
0 
2002 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.20E+0
2 
5.56E+0
8 
-
0.2
7 
0.0
6 
4.48E+0
8 
7.79E+0
6 
2.23E+0
0 
2003 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.34E+0
2 
7.06E+0
8 
-
0.2
0 
0.0
6 
6.00E+0
8 
8.04E+0
6 
2.45E+0
0 
2004 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.39E+0
2 
1.49E+0
9 
-
0.2
0 
-
0.1
2 
9.29E+0
8 
8.31E+0
6 
2.84E+0
0 
2005 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.43E+0
2 
1.05E+0
9 
-
0.3
2 
0.1
0 
8.44E+0
8 
8.58E+0
6 
2.93E+0
0 
2006 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.47E+0
2 
8.78E+0
8 
-
0.4
3 
-
0.1
2 
1.01E+0
9 
8.87E+0
6 
3.09E+0
0 
2007 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.55E+0
2 
9.44E+0
8 
-
0.3
7 
-
0.1
0 
1.32E+0
9 
9.17E+0
6 
3.45E+0
0 
2008 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.65E+0
2 
8.19E+0
8 
-
0.4
5 
-
0.1
6 
1.86E+0
9 
9.49E+0
6 
3.34E+0
0 
2009 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.46E+0
2 
4.41E+0
8 
-
0.7
2 
-
0.2
0 
1.45E+0
9 
9.81E+0
6 
3.53E+0
0 
2010 
Madagasca
r 26 
2.43E+0
2 
4.70E+0
8 
-
0.8
5 
-
0.2
9  
1.01E+0
7 
3.69E+0
0 
1996 Malawi 27 
1.53E+0
2 
6.34E+0
8 
-
0.4
5 
-
0.2
2 
2.22E+0
8 
4.30E+0
6 5.69E-01 
1997 Malawi 27 
1.55E+0
2 
4.77E+0
8   
2.48E+0
8 
4.39E+0
6  
1998 Malawi 27 
1.57E+0
2 
6.18E+0
8 
-
0.4
8 
-
0.1
9 
1.94E+0
8 
4.50E+0
6  
1999 Malawi 27 
1.57E+0
2 
6.29E+0
8   
2.24E+0
8 
4.65E+0
6 2.98E-01 
2000 Malawi 27 
1.55E+0
2 
6.43E+0
8 
-
0.5
0 
-
0.2
1 
2.15E+0
8 
4.82E+0
6 3.28E-01 
2001 Malawi 27 
1.44E+0
2 
6.33E+0
8   
2.37E+0
8 
4.98E+0
6 3.74E-01 
2002 Malawi 27 1.42E+0 5.50E+0 - -  5.15E+0 4.09E-01 
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2 8 0.4
7 
1.0
1 
6 
2003 Malawi 27 
1.46E+0
2 
6.58E+0
8 
-
0.2
5 
-
0.7
8 
3.43E+0
8 
5.33E+0
6 4.25E-01 
2004 Malawi 27 
1.50E+0
2 
5.79E+0
8 
-
0.1
2 
-
0.7
6 
4.26E+0
8 
5.52E+0
6 5.07E-01 
2005 Malawi 27 
1.50E+0
2 
6.46E+0
8 
-
0.1
2 
-
0.7
4 
5.56E+0
8 
5.72E+0
6 4.95E-01 
2006 Malawi 27 
1.57E+0
2 
7.79E+0
8 
-
0.2
5 
-
0.5
4 
7.08E+0
8 
5.92E+0
6 5.17E-01 
2007 Malawi 27 
1.61E+0
2 
7.48E+0
8 
-
0.1
9 
-
0.5
4 
8.29E+0
8 
6.06E+0
6 5.10E-01 
2008 Malawi 27 
1.70E+0
2 
8.89E+0
8 
-
0.1
4 
-
0.4
3 
9.48E+0
8 
6.31E+0
6  
2009 Malawi 27 
1.79E+0
2 
7.82E+0
8 
-
0.1
3 
-
0.3
9 
1.03E+0
9 
6.51E+0
6  
2010 Malawi 27 
1.85E+0
2 
1.02E+0
9 
-
0.1
5 
-
0.4
3 
1.10E+0
9 
6.71E+0
6 7.20E-01 
 
199
6 Mali 
2
8 
1.92E+0
2 
6.35E+0
8 
-
0.5
3 
-
0.4
4 
4.47E+0
8 
2.72E+0
6 
1.07E+0
0 
199
7 Mali 
2
8 
2.00E+0
2 
6.10E+0
8   
3.99E+0
8 
2.80E+0
6 
1.50E+0
0 
199
8 Mali 
2
8 
2.06E+0
2 
5.02E+0
8 
-
0.5
2 
-
0.6
3 
4.24E+0
8 
2.88E+0
6 
1.49E+0
0 
199
9 Mali 
2
8 
2.14E+0
2 
5.17E+0
8   
4.43E+0
8 
2.97E+0
6 
1.81E+0
0 
200
0 Mali 
2
8 
2.14E+0
2 
4.57E+0
8 
-
0.4
6 
-
0.6
6 
5.95E+0
8 
3.06E+0
6 
1.85E+0
0 
200
1 Mali 
2
8 
2.33E+0
2 
5.65E+0
8   
9.25E+0
8 
3.15E+0
6 
1.98E+0
0 
200
2 Mali 
2
8 
2.36E+0
2 
6.44E+0
8 
-
0.3
2 
-
0.5
3 
6.60E+0
8 
3.26E+0
6 
1.99E+0
0 
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200
3 Mali 
2
8 
2.45E+0
2 
7.30E+0
8 
-
0.0
3 
-
0.5
4 
1.01E+0
9 
3.37E+0
6 
2.19E+0
0 
200
4 Mali 
2
8 
2.43E+0
2 
7.04E+0
8 
-
0.1
7 
-
0.5
0 
8.10E+0
8 
3.49E+0
6 
2.37E+0
0 
200
5 Mali 
2
8 
2.50E+0
2 
8.37E+0
8 
-
0.1
4 
-
0.4
0 
9.30E+0
8 
3.61E+0
6 
2.68E+0
0 
200
6 Mali 
2
8 
2.55E+0
2 
9.72E+0
8 
-
0.3
1 
-
0.4
1 
9.79E+0
8 
3.74E+0
6  
200
7 Mali 
2
8 
2.58E+0
2 
1.04E+0
9 
-
0.2
1 
-
0.3
4 
1.04E+0
9 
3.87E+0
6 
5.07E+0
0 
200
8 Mali 
2
8 
2.63E+0
2 
9.39E+0
8 
-
0.3
5 
-
0.4
5  
4.01E+0
6 
5.09E+0
0 
200
9 Mali 
2
8 
2.66E+0
2 
9.91E+0
8 
-
0.3
8 
-
0.6
7  
4.15E+0
6 
5.61E+0
0 
201
0 Mali 
2
8 
2.73E+0
2 
1.09E+0
9 
-
0.4
6 
-
0.6
8  
4.30E+0
6 
5.80E+0
0 
199
6 Mauritania 
2
9 
5.10E+0
2 
3.49E+0
8 
-
0.3
9 
-
0.0
1  
6.43E+0
5 
3.74E+0
0 
199
7 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.76E+0
2 
3.35E+0
8    
6.74E+0
5  
199
8 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.83E+0
2 
2.38E+0
8 
-
0.4
0 
-
0.2
0 
1.77E+0
8 
7.01E+0
5 
3.83E+0
0 
199
9 Mauritania 
2
9 
5.06E+0
2 
3.18E+0
8   
1.73E+0
8 
7.29E+0
5 
5.13E+0
0 
200
0 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.90E+0
2 
3.45E+0
8 
-
0.3
5 
-
0.2
5 
2.10E+0
8 
7.60E+0
5  
200
1 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.85E+0
2 
4.55E+0
8   
2.38E+0
8 
7.95E+0
5 
3.40E+0
0 
200
2 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.74E+0
2 
5.59E+0
8 
-
0.4
7 
0.2
3 
2.34E+0
8 
8.30E+0
5 
2.99E+0
0 
200
3 Mauritania 
2
9 
4.88E+0
2 
3.36E+0
8 
-
0.5
1 
0.2
1 
3.49E+0
8 
8.64E+0
5 
3.19E+0
0 
200 Mauritania 2 5.02E+0 2.29E+0 - - 7.08E+0 8.99E+0 3.23E+0
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4 9 2 8 0.6
8 
0.3
7 
8 5 0 
200
5 Mauritania 
2
9 
5.32E+0
2 
2.17E+0
8 
-
0.6
4 
-
0.3
6 
1.08E+0
9 
9.34E+0
5 
2.96E+0
0 
200
6 Mauritania 
2
9 
6.16E+0
2 
2.53E+0
8 
-
0.7
0 
-
0.6
8 
7.61E+0
8 
9.56E+0
5 
3.35E+0
0 
200
7 Mauritania 
2
9 
6.10E+0
2 
3.59E+0
8 
-
0.6
2 
-
0.5
1 
7.63E+0
8 
1.00E+0
6 
3.79E+0
0 
200
8 Mauritania 
2
9 
6.16E+0
2 
4.40E+0
8 
-
1.0
9 
-
0.7
2 
1.09E+0
9 
1.04E+0
6 
3.77E+0
0 
200
9 Mauritania 
2
9 
5.93E+0
2 
3.71E+0
8 
-
0.7
9 
-
0.5
7 
8.99E+0
8 
1.08E+0
6 
3.84E+0
0 
201
0 Mauritania 
2
9 
6.09E+0
2 
3.74E+0
8 
-
0.8
7 
-
0.6
9 
1.04E+0
9 
1.12E+0
6 
4.36E+0
0 
199
6 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.22E+0
3 
2.93E+0
7 
0.8
6 
0.5
4 
8.74E+0
8 
4.93E+0
5 
6.57E+0
0 
199
7 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.36E+0
3 
6.27E+0
7   
9.69E+0
8 
5.02E+0
5 
6.64E+0
0 
199
8 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.53E+0
3 
5.83E+0
7 
1.0
2 
0.6
1 
9.31E+0
8 
5.10E+0
5  
199
9 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.58E+0
3 
6.33E+0
7   
1.15E+0
9 
5.20E+0
5 
9.55E+0
0 
200
0 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.86E+0
3 
3.36E+0
7 
0.9
5 
0.5
5 
1.05E+0
9 
5.27E+0
5 
1.08E+0
1 
200
1 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.92E+0
3 
3.38E+0
7   
1.10E+0
9 
5.36E+0
5 
1.72E+0
1 
200
2 Mauritius 
3
0 
3.97E+0
3 
3.74E+0
7 
1.0
1 
0.5
7 
1.10E+0
9 
5.37E+0
5 
1.63E+0
1 
200
3 Mauritius 
3
0 
4.07E+0
3 
-
1.87E+0
7 
1.0
6 
0.4
3 
1.21E+0
9 
5.39E+0
5 
1.73E+0
1 
200
4 Mauritius 
3
0 
4.27E+0
3 
3.95E+0
7 
1.0
1 
0.3
4 
1.24E+0
9 
5.39E+0
5 
1.84E+0
1 
200
5 Mauritius 
3
0 
4.28E+0
3 
4.10E+0
7 
1.0
1 
0.4
0 
1.22E+0
9 
5.50E+0
5 
2.16E+0
1 
200
6 Mauritius 
3
0 
4.42E+0
3 
2.23E+0
7 
0.8
2 
0.3
9 
1.45E+0
9 
5.57E+0
5 
2.30E+0
1 
200
7 Mauritius 
3
0 
4.65E+0
3 
6.99E+0
7 
0.8
5 
0.4
9 
1.53E+0
9 
5.61E+0
5 
2.31E+0
1 
200 Mauritius 3 4.88E+0 1.02E+0 0.9 0.5 1.55E+0 5.70E+0 2.49E+0
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8 0 3 8 5 9 9 5 1 
200
9 Mauritius 
3
0 
5.00E+0
3 
1.50E+0
8 
0.9
3 
0.6
6 
1.69E+0
9 
5.78E+0
5  
201
0 Mauritius 
3
0 
5.18E+0
3 
1.25E+0
8 
0.8
5 
0.6
7 
1.68E+0
9 
5.95E+0
5  
199
6 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
1.94E+0
2 
1.21E+0
9 
-
0.8
4 
-
0.3
6 
6.23E+0
8 
7.72E+0
6 4.71E-01 
199
7 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.08E+0
2 
1.39E+0
9   
7.25E+0
8 
7.95E+0
6  
199
8 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.25E+0
2 
1.54E+0
9 
-
0.8
4 
-
0.3
5 
7.20E+0
8 
8.23E+0
6  
199
9 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.37E+0
2 
1.21E+0
9   
8.41E+0
8 
8.48E+0
6 6.10E-01 
200
0 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.33E+0
2 
1.43E+0
9 
-
0.7
7 
-
0.4
0 
1.32E+0
9 
8.73E+0
6 6.70E-01 
200
1 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.54E+0
2 
1.51E+0
9   
9.95E+0
8 
8.97E+0
6  
200
2 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.69E+0
2 
3.43E+0
9 
-
0.6
5 
-
0.4
5 
1.33E+0
9 
9.20E+0
6  
200
3 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.78E+0
2 
1.36E+0
9 
-
0.6
8 
-
0.5
8 
1.23E+0
9 
9.44E+0
6 9.32E-01 
200
4 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
2.92E+0
2 
1.47E+0
9 
-
0.6
5 
-
0.5
9 
1.16E+0
9 
9.66E+0
6 
1.18E+0
0 
200
5 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.12E+0
2 
1.49E+0
9 
-
0.6
1 
-
0.5
4 
1.27E+0
9 
9.88E+0
6 
1.46E+0
0 
200
6 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.24E+0
2 
1.83E+0
9 
-
0.6
1 
-
0.6
0 
1.35E+0
9 
1.01E+0
7  
200
7 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.39E+0
2 
1.80E+0
9 
-
0.6
1 
-
0.5
0 
1.43E+0
9 
1.03E+0
7  
200
8 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.54E+0
2 
1.92E+0
9 
-
0.6
1 
-
0.4
8 
1.59E+0
9 
1.06E+0
7  
200
9 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.68E+0
2 
2.02E+0
9 
-
0.6
0 
-
0.4
1 
2.41E+0
9 
1.08E+0
7  
201
0 
Mozambiqu
e 
3
1 
3.84E+0
2 
1.95E+0
9 
-
0.4
-
0.3
2.93E+0
9 
1.11E+0
7  
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8 9 
199
6 Namibia 
3
2 
2.00E+0
3 
2.46E+0
8 
0.2
0 
0.7
1 
6.34E+0
8 
5.50E+0
5  
199
7 Namibia 
3
2 
2.02E+0
3 
2.39E+0
8   
5.50E+0
8 
5.64E+0
5 
5.27E+0
0 
199
8 Namibia 
3
2 
2.03E+0
3 
2.65E+0
8 
0.2
0 
0.5
9 
6.84E+0
8 
5.91E+0
5 
6.46E+0
0 
199
9 Namibia 
3
2 
2.04E+0
3 
2.59E+0
8   
7.12E+0
8 
6.16E+0
5  
200
0 Namibia 
3
2 
2.06E+0
3 
2.46E+0
8 
0.1
9 
0.4
7 
6.48E+0
8 
6.38E+0
5  
200
1 Namibia 
3
2 
2.04E+0
3 
1.83E+0
8   
8.77E+0
8 
6.69E+0
5 
7.00E+0
0 
200
2 Namibia 
3
2 
2.10E+0
3 
2.18E+0
8 
0.2
6 
-
0.0
4 
8.70E+0
8 
6.97E+0
5 
5.72E+0
0 
200
3 Namibia 
3
2 
2.15E+0
3 
1.87E+0
8 
0.2
5 
0.1
8 
8.30E+0
8 
7.25E+0
5 
6.04E+0
0 
200
4 Namibia 
3
2 
2.37E+0
3 
2.03E+0
8 
-
0.0
1 
0.1
2 
8.78E+0
8 
7.52E+0
5  
200
5 Namibia 
3
2 
2.39E+0
3 
1.43E+0
8 
-
0.0
7 
0.1
8 
9.10E+0
8 
7.82E+0
5 
6.67E+0
0 
200
6 Namibia 
3
2 
2.51E+0
3 
1.67E+0
8 
0.1
3 
0.1
7 
1.18E+0
9 
8.12E+0
5 
6.33E+0
0 
200
7 Namibia 
3
2 
2.60E+0
3 
2.23E+0
8 
0.1
1 
0.2
6 
1.32E+0
9 
8.45E+0
5  
200
8 Namibia 
3
2 
2.64E+0
3 
2.06E+0
8 
0.3
6 
0.5
7 
1.51E+0
9 
8.78E+0
5 
8.96E+0
0 
200
9 Namibia 
3
2 
2.58E+0
3 
3.22E+0
8 
0.2
4 
0.2
0 
1.47E+0
9 
9.04E+0
5  
201
0 Namibia 
3
2 
2.70E+0
3 
2.56E+0
8 
0.2
2 
0.2
7 
1.39E+0
9 
9.29E+0
5  
199
6 Niger 
3
3 
1.70E+0
2 
3.29E+0
8 
-
1.0
0 
-
1.0
9 
1.86E+0
8 
2.95E+0
6  
199
7 Niger 
3
3 
1.69E+0
2 
4.76E+0
8   
1.95E+0
8 
3.08E+0
6  
199
8 Niger 
3
3 
1.80E+0
2 
4.21E+0
8 
-
0.7
4 
-
1.0
3 
2.29E+0
8 
3.23E+0
6  
199
9 Niger 
3
3 
1.73E+0
2 
2.72E+0
8   
2.01E+0
8 
3.37E+0
6  
200
0 Niger 
3
3 
1.65E+0
2 
3.25E+0
8 
-
0.9
-
0.9
2.01E+0
8 
3.53E+0
6  
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3 4 
200
1 Niger 
3
3 
1.70E+0
2 
4.18E+0
8   
2.32E+0
8 
3.68E+0
6  
200
2 Niger 
3
3 
1.69E+0
2 
4.54E+0
8 
-
0.7
8 
-
1.0
7 
3.03E+0
8 
3.82E+0
6  
200
3 Niger 
3
3 
1.72E+0
2 
6.26E+0
8 
-
0.6
6 
-
1.0
2 
3.82E+0
8 
3.98E+0
6 9.78E-01 
200
4 Niger 
3
3 
1.67E+0
2 
6.46E+0
8 
-
0.7
3 
-
0.8
5 
4.82E+0
8 
4.13E+0
6 9.44E-01 
200
5 Niger 
3
3 
1.68E+0
2 
6.04E+0
8 
-
0.8
0 
-
0.7
3 
6.30E+0
8 
4.28E+0
6 
1.13E+0
0 
200
6 Niger 
3
3 
1.72E+0
2 
6.11E+0
8 
-
0.6
7 
-
0.8
5  
4.43E+0
6 
1.15E+0
0 
200
7 Niger 
3
3 
1.71E+0
2 
5.65E+0
8 
-
0.7
0 
-
0.7
8  
4.59E+0
6 
1.06E+0
0 
200
8 Niger 
3
3 
1.80E+0
2 
5.91E+0
8 
-
0.7
7 
-
0.7
5  
4.76E+0
6 
1.19E+0
0 
200
9 Niger 
3
3 
1.72E+0
2 
4.67E+0
8 
-
0.5
7 
-
0.6
1  
4.93E+0
6 
1.42E+0
0 
201
0 Niger 
3
3 
1.79E+0
2 
7.45E+0
8 
-
0.5
7 
-
0.6
7  
5.11E+0
6 
1.46E+0
0 
  
1996 Nigeria 34 3.66E+02 2.47E+08 -1.26 -1.15  3.57E+07  
1997 Nigeria 34 3.67E+02 2.77E+08    3.66E+07  
1998 Nigeria 34 3.66E+02 2.87E+08 -1.27 -1.07  3.75E+07  
1999 Nigeria 34 3.61E+02 2.10E+08    3.84E+07 6.01E+00 
2000 Nigeria 34 3.72E+02 2.46E+08 -1.11 -1.13  3.92E+07  
2001 Nigeria 34 3.74E+02 2.63E+08    4.01E+07  
2002 Nigeria 34 3.71E+02 4.19E+08 -1.48 -1.33  4.10E+07  
2003 Nigeria 34 3.99E+02 3.85E+08 -1.52 -1.32  4.18E+07 9.53E+00 
2004 Nigeria 34 4.31E+02 6.54E+08 -1.43 -1.31  4.26E+07 9.73E+00 
2005 Nigeria 34 4.43E+02 6.95E+09 -1.36 -1.15  4.37E+07 1.03E+01 
2006 Nigeria 34 4.59E+02 1.24E+10 -1.11 -1.06  4.50E+07  
2007 Nigeria 34 4.76E+02 1.95E+09 -1.10 -0.98  4.62E+07  
2008 Nigeria 34 4.92E+02 1.27E+09 -1.10 -0.81  4.76E+07  
2009 Nigeria 34 5.14E+02 1.67E+09 -1.20 -1.00  4.89E+07  
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2010 Nigeria 34 5.40E+02 2.06E+09 -1.21 -1.00  5.03E+07  
1996 Rwanda 35 2.07E+02 6.34E+08 -1.73 -0.93 1.99E+08 2.63E+06  
1997 Rwanda 35 2.18E+02 3.46E+08   2.56E+08 2.89E+06  
1998 Rwanda 35 2.15E+02 5.11E+08 -1.54 -0.78 2.95E+08 3.21E+06  
1999 Rwanda 35 2.12E+02 5.33E+08   3.33E+08 3.53E+06 8.71E-01 
2000 Rwanda 35 2.14E+02 4.93E+08 -1.35 -0.65 3.18E+08 3.80E+06 1.29E+00 
2001 Rwanda 35 2.23E+02 4.75E+08   3.19E+08 3.99E+06 1.61E+00 
2002 Rwanda 35 2.40E+02 5.32E+08 -0.93 -0.46 2.90E+08 4.15E+06 1.88E+00 
2003 Rwanda 35 2.41E+02 4.29E+08 -0.88 -0.60 3.31E+08 4.27E+06 2.29E+00 
2004 Rwanda 35 2.55E+02 5.66E+08 -0.81 -0.48 3.14E+08 4.37E+06 2.72E+00 
2005 Rwanda 35 2.72E+02 6.48E+08 -0.92 -0.74 4.07E+08 4.50E+06 2.87E+00 
2006 Rwanda 35 2.90E+02 6.55E+08 -0.66 -0.17 4.98E+08 4.63E+06 3.68E+00 
2007 Rwanda 35 2.97E+02 7.28E+08 -0.57 0.01 6.75E+08 4.78E+06 3.72E+00 
2008 Rwanda 35 3.21E+02 9.02E+08 -0.47 0.14 1.07E+09 4.92E+06 3.98E+00 
2009 Rwanda 35 3.24E+02 9.32E+08 -0.50 0.14 1.13E+09 5.08E+06 4.82E+00 
2010 Rwanda 35 3.37E+02 1.03E+09 -0.31 0.48 1.18E+09 5.23E+06 5.49E+00 
1996 
Sao 
Tome 36  6.37E+07 0.08 -0.01  4.05E+04  
1997 
Sao 
Tome 36  5.02E+07    4.16E+04  
1998 
Sao 
Tome 36  4.22E+07 -0.34 -0.52  4.27E+04  
1999 
Sao 
Tome 36  4.27E+07    4.39E+04  
2000 
Sao 
Tome 36  5.80E+07 -0.09 -0.08  4.51E+04  
2001 
Sao 
Tome 36  6.53E+07    4.63E+04  
2002 
Sao 
Tome 36  4.16E+07 -0.56 -0.32  4.76E+04  
2003 
Sao 
Tome 36  4.96E+07 -0.54 -0.61  4.89E+04  
2004 
Sao 
Tome 36  3.99E+07 -0.40 -0.60  5.02E+04  
2005 
Sao 
Tome 36  3.77E+07 -0.61 -0.86  5.16E+04  
2006 
Sao 
Tome 36  2.57E+07 -0.57 -0.54  5.29E+04  
2007 
Sao 
Tome 36  5.27E+07 -0.45 -0.48  5.42E+04  
2008 
Sao 
Tome 36  4.66E+07 -0.49 -0.45  5.56E+04  
2009 
Sao 
Tome 36  2.98E+07 -0.73 -0.40  5.70E+04 4.19E+00 
2010 Sao 36  4.93E+07 -0.72 -0.44  5.86E+04 4.48E+00 
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Tome 
 
1996 senegal 37 4.56E+02 7.46E+08 
-
0.23 
-
0.22 1.03E+09 3.53E+06  
1997 senegal 37 4.58E+02 6.04E+08   9.11E+08 3.63E+06  
1998 senegal 37 4.73E+02 7.24E+08 
-
0.03 
-
0.20 1.17E+09 3.73E+06  
1999 senegal 37 4.91E+02 7.89E+08   1.15E+09 3.83E+06 3.44E+00 
2000 senegal 37 4.94E+02 6.76E+08 0.01 
-
0.11 1.05E+09 3.95E+06  
2001 senegal 37 5.03E+02 6.88E+08   1.11E+09 4.07E+06  
2002 senegal 37 4.93E+02 6.70E+08 0.04 0.31 1.32E+09 4.21E+06  
2003 senegal 37 5.12E+02 5.98E+08 
-
0.08 
-
0.14 1.45E+09 4.34E+06 5.26E+00 
2004 senegal 37 5.27E+02 1.26E+09 
-
0.02 
-
0.06 1.82E+09 4.47E+06 5.31E+00 
2005 senegal 37 5.42E+02 8.08E+08 
-
0.01 
-
0.03 2.58E+09 4.62E+06 5.84E+00 
2006 senegal 37 5.41E+02 9.72E+08 
-
0.24 
-
0.43 2.64E+09 4.76E+06 6.00E+00 
2007 senegal 37 5.52E+02 8.96E+08 
-
0.25 
-
0.56 3.50E+09 4.91E+06 6.65E+00 
2008 senegal 37 5.57E+02 1.04E+09 
-
0.28 
-
0.53 4.04E+09 5.06E+06 8.30E+00 
2009 senegal 37 5.54E+02 1.01E+09 
-
0.37 
-
0.54 3.56E+09 5.22E+06 8.34E+00 
2010 senegal 37 5.62E+02 9.28E+08 
-
0.41 
-
0.70 3.73E+09 5.38E+06 7.92E+00 
1996 Seychelles 38 6.24E+03 2.51E+07 0.75 0.90 9.08E+07 1.48E+06  
1997 Seychelles 38 6.91E+03 2.45E+07   9.28E+07 1.48E+06  
1998 Seychelles 38 7.34E+03 3.57E+07 0.47 0.22 1.55E+08 1.49E+06  
1999 Seychelles 38 7.33E+03 1.86E+07   1.81E+08 1.52E+06  
2000 Seychelles 38 7.58E+03 3.55E+07 0.58 0.46 1.55E+08 1.56E+06  
2001 Seychelles 38 7.40E+03 2.02E+07   2.44E+08 1.62E+06  
2002 Seychelles 38 7.27E+03 8.53E+07 0.39 0.31 1.56E+08 1.69E+06  
2003 Seychelles 38 6.91E+03 1.32E+07 0.14 0.33 5.94E+07 1.77E+06  
2004 Seychelles 38 6.74E+03 1.27E+07 0.17 0.20 7.08E+07 1.90E+06  
2005 Seychelles 38 7.21E+03 1.94E+07 0.02 0.14 1.70E+08 1.98E+06  
2006 Seychelles 38 7.72E+03 1.56E+07 0.01 0.09 1.94E+08 2.04E+06  
2007 Seychelles 38 8.42E+03 1.17E+07 0.12 0.19 2.62E+08 2.10E+06  
2008 Seychelles 38 8.15E+03 1.24E+07 0.22 0.25 2.43E+08 2.16E+06  
2009 Seychelles 38 8.16E+03 2.26E+07 0.06 0.32 2.53E+08 2.21E+06  
2010 Seychelles 38 8.79E+03 5.60E+07 0.02 0.29  2.26E+06  
1996 Sierraleone 39 2.07E+02 2.41E+08 - - 9.43E+07 1.31E+07  
92 
 
1.48 0.77 
1997 Sierraleone 39 1.72E+02 1.69E+08   3.70E+07 1.36E+07  
1998 Sierraleone 39 1.69E+02 1.52E+08 
-
1.19 
-
0.87 3.70E+07 1.41E+07  
1999 Sierraleone 39 1.52E+02 1.06E+08   2.33E+07 1.47E+07  
2000 Sierraleone 39 1.53E+02 2.68E+08 
-
1.47 
-
0.91 4.37E+07 1.52E+07 1.68E+00 
2001 Sierraleone 39 1.75E+02 5.22E+08   5.36E+07 1.57E+07 2.15E+00 
2002 Sierraleone 39 2.13E+02 5.53E+08 
-
1.33 
-
0.75 9.45E+07 1.61E+07 2.10E+00 
2003 Sierraleone 39 2.21E+02 4.23E+08 
-
1.21 
-
0.91 1.37E+08 1.65E+07  
2004 Sierraleone 39 2.27E+02 4.31E+08 
-
1.17 
-
0.88 1.15E+08 1.69E+07  
2005 Sierraleone 39 2.34E+02 3.79E+08 
-
1.18 
-
1.09 2.10E+08 1.72E+07  
2006 Sierraleone 39 2.43E+02 4.17E+08 
-
1.04 
-
1.05 2.17E+08 1.76E+07  
2007 Sierraleone 39 2.51E+02 5.52E+08 
-
1.03 
-
0.90 2.19E+08 1.80E+07  
2008 Sierraleone 39 2.59E+02 3.61E+08 
-
0.96 
-
0.94 2.88E+08 1.87E+07  
2009 Sierraleone 39 2.61E+02 4.47E+08 
-
0.92 
-
0.93 2.86E+08 1.84E+07  
2010 Sierraleone 39 2.68E+02 4.67E+08 
-
0.95 
-
0.76 3.01E+08 1.82E+07  
 
1996 
South 
Africa 40 3.02E+03 4.90E+08 
-
0.01 0.76 1.89E+10   
1997 
South 
Africa 40 3.03E+03 7.08E+08   2.00E+10   
1998 
South 
Africa 40 2.97E+03 7.42E+08 0.16 0.65 2.10E+10   
1999 
South 
Africa 40 2.97E+03 7.84E+08   1.94E+10   
2000 
South 
Africa 40 3.02E+03 7.55E+08 0.10 0.61 2.01E+10   
2001 
South 
Africa 40 3.04E+03 6.75E+08   2.08E+10   
2002 
South 
Africa 40 3.11E+03 7.71E+08 0.05 0.39 2.17E+10   
2003 
South 
Africa 40 3.16E+03 8.32E+08 0.04 0.34 2.39E+10   
2004 
South 
Africa 40 3.26E+03 7.27E+08 0.09 0.48 2.70E+10   
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2005 
South 
Africa 40 3.40E+03 7.82E+08 0.08 0.58 2.99E+10   
2006 
South 
Africa 40 3.55E+03 7.99E+08 0.23 0.43 3.35E+10   
2007 
South 
Africa 40 3.70E+03 8.29E+08 0.06 0.21 3.83E+10   
2008 
South 
Africa 40 3.80E+03 1.09E+09 0.02 0.16 4.28E+10   
2009 
South 
Africa 40 3.70E+03 1.08E+09 0.09 0.11 4.38E+10   
2010 
South 
Africa 40 3.75E+03 1.03E+09 0.10 0.09 4.11E+10   
1996 Sudan 41 3.10E+02  
-
1.63 
-
1.28 7.54E+08 7.45E+06 4.07E+00 
1997 Sudan 41 3.34E+02    1.10E+09 7.66E+06  
1998 Sudan 41 3.40E+02  
-
1.63 
-
1.02 1.31E+09 7.88E+06  
1999 Sudan 41 3.42E+02    1.27E+09 8.10E+06 6.15E+00 
2000 Sudan 41 3.62E+02  
-
1.50 
-
0.80 1.49E+09 8.32E+06 6.09E+00 
2001 Sudan 41 3.75E+02    1.53E+09 8.56E+06  
2002 Sudan 41 3.86E+02  
-
1.28 
-
1.02 1.78E+09 8.80E+06  
2003 Sudan 41 4.04E+02  
-
1.58 
-
1.24 1.97E+09 9.03E+06  
2004 Sudan 41 4.02E+02  
-
1.48 
-
1.28 2.37E+09 9.30E+06  
2005 Sudan 41 4.18E+02  
-
1.60 
-
1.45 2.64E+09 9.56E+06  
2006 Sudan 41 4.54E+02  
-
1.31 
-
1.17 3.06E+09 9.81E+06  
2007 Sudan 41 4.87E+02  
-
1.38 
-
1.34 3.29E+09 1.01E+07  
2008 Sudan 41 5.07E+02  
-
1.41 
-
1.48 3.48E+09 1.03E+07  
2009 Sudan 41 5.14E+02  
-
1.26 
-
1.21 3.34E+09 1.05E+07  
2010 Sudan 41 5.24E+02  
-
1.32 
-
1.33  1.08E+07  
1996 Swaziland 42 1.40E+03 4.05E+07 
-
0.53 
-
0.01 4.56E+08 2.94E+05 6.19E+00 
1997 Swaziland 42 1.41E+03 3.83E+07   4.65E+08 3.04E+05  
1998 Swaziland 42 1.44E+03 4.72E+07 
-
0.59 
-
0.02 4.98E+08 3.08E+05  
1999 Swaziland 42 1.48E+03 4.00E+07   3.50E+08 3.11E+05 4.79E+00 
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2000 Swaziland 42 1.51E+03 1.94E+07 
-
0.68 
-
0.25 2.76E+08 3.15E+05 4.46E+00 
2001 Swaziland 42 1.52E+03 4.77E+07   3.82E+08 3.18E+05 4.28E+00 
2002 Swaziland 42 1.55E+03 3.39E+07 
-
0.67 
-
0.32 3.19E+08 3.22E+05 4.53E+00 
2003 Swaziland 42 1.58E+03 5.18E+07 
-
0.75 
-
0.55 3.45E+08 3.25E+05 4.55E+00 
2004 Swaziland 42 1.63E+03 2.92E+07 
-
0.83 
-
0.58 2.75E+08 3.29E+05 5.44E+00 
2005 Swaziland 42 1.66E+03 5.68E+07 
-
0.87 
-
0.48 2.72E+08 3.33E+05 4.73E+00 
2006 Swaziland 42 1.72E+03 4.07E+07 
-
0.68 
-
0.29 2.67E+08 3.37E+05 4.43E+00 
2007 Swaziland 42 1.77E+03 5.35E+07 
-
0.77 
-
0.24 2.57E+08 3.42E+05  
2008 Swaziland 42 1.79E+03 6.86E+07 
-
0.63 
-
0.18 2.38E+08 3.51E+05  
2009 Swaziland 42 1.80E+03 5.63E+07 
-
0.61 
-
0.19 2.16E+08 3.60E+05  
2010 Swaziland 42 1.81E+03 9.15E+07 
-
0.49 
-
0.17 2.25E+08 3.68E+05  
 
1996 Tanzania 43 2.88E+02 1.15E+09 
-
0.25 
-
1.03 1.29E+09 1.50E+07 5.51E-01 
1997 Tanzania 43 2.91E+02 1.36E+09   1.30E+09 1.54E+07 6.38E-01 
1998 Tanzania 43 2.94E+02 1.43E+09 
-
0.29 
-
0.97 1.48E+09 1.59E+07 5.52E-01 
1999 Tanzania 43 3.01E+02 1.45E+09   1.57E+09 1.63E+07 6.35E-01 
2000 Tanzania 43 3.08E+02 1.56E+09 
-
0.39 
-
0.95 1.67E+09 1.67E+07  
2001 Tanzania 43 3.18E+02 1.92E+09   1.87E+09 1.72E+07 6.93E-01 
2002 Tanzania 43 3.32E+02 1.93E+09 
-
0.39 
-
0.94 2.01E+09 1.77E+07 8.14E-01 
2003 Tanzania 43 3.46E+02 2.20E+09 
-
0.29 
-
0.78 2.30E+09 1.82E+07 9.28E-01 
2004 Tanzania 43 3.63E+02 2.06E+09 
-
0.36 
-
0.58 2.53E+09 1.87E+07 1.25E+00 
2005 Tanzania 43 3.80E+02 1.69E+09 
-
0.26 
-
0.65 3.01E+09 1.93E+07 1.46E+00 
2006 Tanzania 43 3.94E+02 2.07E+09 
-
0.44 
-
0.22 3.49E+09 1.98E+07  
2007 Tanzania 43 4.11E+02 3.04E+09 
-
0.36 
-
0.34 4.00E+09 2.04E+07  
2008 Tanzania 43 4.29E+02 2.25E+09 
-
0.35 
-
0.42 4.31E+09 2.09E+07  
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2009 Tanzania 43 4.42E+02 2.97E+09 
-
0.51 
-
0.44 4.74E+09 2.15E+07  
2010 Tanzania 43 4.59E+02 2.96E+09 
-
0.52 
-
0.52 5.00E+09 2.21E+07 2.11E+00 
1996 Togo 44 2.71E+02 1.93E+08 
-
0.76 
-
0.76 1.55E+08 1.82E+06 2.78E+00 
1997 Togo 44 3.00E+02 1.71E+08   1.45E+08 1.89E+06  
1998 Togo 44 2.83E+02 1.82E+08 
-
0.76 
-
0.63 1.87E+08 1.98E+06 3.14E+00 
1999 Togo 44 2.80E+02 9.99E+07   1.80E+08 2.07E+06  
2000 Togo 44 2.70E+02 1.08E+08 
-
0.71 
-
0.66 1.87E+08 2.15E+06  
2001 Togo 44 2.58E+02 7.38E+07   1.90E+08 2.23E+06  
2002 Togo 44 2.50E+02 7.82E+07 
-
0.79 
-
0.77 2.03E+08 2.31E+06  
2003 Togo 44 2.56E+02 6.49E+07 
-
0.98 
-
0.90 2.15E+08 2.38E+06  
2004 Togo 44 2.56E+02 7.77E+07 
-
1.13 
-
0.93 2.13E+08 2.46E+06  
2005 Togo 44 2.53E+02 9.54E+07 
-
1.09 
-
0.78 2.34E+08 2.54E+06  
2006 Togo 44 2.57E+02 8.96E+07 
-
0.98 
-
1.07 2.57E+08 2.62E+06 5.20E+00 
2007 Togo 44 2.58E+02 1.24E+08 
-
0.90 
-
0.94 2.36E+08 2.69E+06 5.88E+00 
2008 Togo 44 2.58E+02 3.13E+08 
-
0.78 
-
0.93 2.58E+08 2.77E+06  
2009 Togo 44 2.61E+02 5.00E+08 
-
0.89 
-
1.04 3.16E+08 2.86E+06  
2010 Togo 44 2.65E+02 4.19E+08 
-
0.92 
-
0.98 3.89E+08 2.94E+06  
1996 Uganda 45 2.35E+02 8.91E+08 
-
0.64 
-
0.60 1.12E+09 9.04E+06 1.80E+00 
1997 Uganda 45 2.39E+02 1.16E+09   1.10E+09 9.30E+06  
1998 Uganda 45 2.44E+02 9.48E+08 
-
0.64 
-
0.92 1.12E+09 9.57E+06  
1999 Uganda 45 2.56E+02 8.64E+08   1.29E+09 9.84E+06 1.93E+00 
2000 Uganda 45 2.56E+02 1.29E+09 
-
0.79 
-
0.85 1.19E+09 1.01E+07 2.57E+00 
2001 Uganda 45 2.61E+02 1.28E+09   1.24E+09 1.04E+07 2.78E+00 
2002 Uganda 45 2.75E+02 1.06E+09 
-
0.65 
-
0.94 1.32E+09 1.08E+07 3.43E+00 
2003 Uganda 45 2.83E+02 1.27E+09 
-
0.54 
-
0.80 1.49E+09 1.10E+07 3.66E+00 
2004 Uganda 45 2.93E+02 1.41E+09 - - 1.66E+09 1.12E+07 3.54E+00 
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0.64 0.75 
2005 Uganda 45 3.01E+02 1.35E+09 
-
0.56 
-
0.85 1.87E+09 1.15E+07  
2006 Uganda 45 3.23E+02 1.72E+09 
-
0.35 
-
0.75 2.25E+09 1.18E+07 3.45E+00 
2007 Uganda 45 3.39E+02 1.75E+09 
-
0.40 
-
0.80 2.61E+09 1.22E+07  
2008 Uganda 45 3.57E+02 1.59E+09 
-
0.39 
-
0.82 2.77E+09 1.26E+07 3.77E+00 
2009 Uganda 45 3.71E+02 1.80E+09 
-
0.43 
-
0.91 3.04E+09 1.30E+07 4.19E+00 
2010 Uganda 45 3.80E+02 1.72E+09 
-
0.41 
-
0.90 2.85E+09 1.34E+07  
 
1996 Zambia 46 3.29E+02 7.99E+08 
-
0.65 
-
1.03 4.61E+08 4.02E+06  
1997 Zambia 46 3.31E+02 8.68E+08   5.81E+08 4.13E+06  
1998 Zambia 46 3.16E+02 5.14E+08 
-
0.53 
-
0.88 7.54E+08 4.26E+06 2.36E+00 
1999 Zambia 46 3.14E+02 8.88E+08   9.16E+08 4.37E+06 2.33E+00 
2000 Zambia 46 3.17E+02 1.20E+09 
-
0.54 
-
0.85 5.18E+08 4.48E+06 2.41E+00 
2001 Zambia 46 3.25E+02 8.84E+08   5.92E+08 4.57E+06  
2002 Zambia 46 3.28E+02 1.21E+09 
-
0.40 
-
0.94 6.26E+08 4.67E+06  
2003 Zambia 46 3.37E+02 9.92E+08 
-
0.47 
-
0.76 6.64E+08 4.75E+06  
2004 Zambia 46 3.47E+02 1.29E+09 
-
0.52 
-
0.68 6.39E+08 4.85E+06  
2005 Zambia 46 3.57E+02 1.33E+09 
-
0.58 
-
0.79 6.78E+08 4.95E+06  
2006 Zambia 46 3.70E+02 1.62E+09 
-
0.59 
-
0.73 7.50E+08 5.06E+06  
2007 Zambia 46 3.83E+02 1.04E+09 
-
0.57 
-
0.57 8.15E+08 5.18E+06  
2008 Zambia 46 3.94E+02 1.08E+09 
-
0.44 
-
0.47 3.25E+09 5.31E+06  
2009 Zambia 46 4.08E+02 1.27E+09 
-
0.46 
-
0.54 2.84E+09 5.44E+06  
2010 Zambia 46 4.32E+02 9.14E+08 
-
0.47 
-
0.58 3.63E+09 5.51E+06  
1996 Zimbabwe 47 5.54E+02 4.89E+08 
-
0.82 
-
0.25 1.54E+09 4.94E+06 3.91E+00 
1997 Zimbabwe 47 5.60E+02 4.75E+08   1.54E+09 5.07E+06  
1998 Zimbabwe 47 5.67E+02 3.81E+08 - - 1.32E+09 5.11E+06  
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0.71 0.65 
1999 Zimbabwe 47 5.56E+02 3.39E+08   1.75E+08 5.14E+06  
2000 Zimbabwe 47 5.35E+02 2.57E+08 
-
1.33 
-
0.95 7.89E+08 5.47E+06  
2001 Zimbabwe 47 5.40E+02 2.54E+08   8.21E+08 5.78E+06  
2002 Zimbabwe 47 4.90E+02 2.86E+08 
-
1.59 
-
1.21 6.45E+08 6.06E+06  
2003 Zimbabwe 47 4.07E+02 2.33E+08 
-
1.68 
-
1.25 7.91E+08 6.30E+06  
2004 Zimbabwe 47 3.84E+02 2.14E+08 
-
1.76 
-
1.31 2.97E+08 6.51E+06  
2005 Zimbabwe 47 3.63E+02 4.22E+08 
-
1.77 
-
1.28 1.15E+08 6.52E+06  
2006 Zimbabwe 47 3.51E+02 2.99E+08 
-
1.70 
-
1.33 1.21E+08 6.50E+06  
2007 Zimbabwe 47 3.40E+02 4.76E+08 
-
1.76 
-
1.36 2.69E+08 6.49E+06  
2008 Zimbabwe 47 2.80E+02 5.99E+08 
-
1.75 
-
1.30 1.45E+08 6.49E+06  
2009 Zimbabwe 47 2.97E+02 7.51E+08 
-
1.82 
-
1.32 1.42E+08 6.52E+06  
2010 Zimbabwe 47 3.21E+02 7.32E+08 
-
1.79 
-
1.30 4.22E+08 6.62E+06 6.19E+00 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
LRGDPK 689 6.201314 1.076913 4.062166 9.088173 
LGFCF 623 20.14106 1.513775 15.78959 24.5029 
LLAB 675 14.69456 1.508442 10.60906 17.73351 
LAID 687 19.51093 1.259951 16.2751 23.24096 
ROL 537 -0.6938175 0.6407454 -2.23 1.06 
COC 563 -0.5925222 0.5890245 -2.06 1.25 
LHUKP 357 0.982328 0.9031915 -1.518684 3.214868 
 
Table 2: Ordinary pooled regression test 
Source SS   df                      MS 
Model 175.505807      6 29.2509678            
Residual 31.1952297    225 .138645465            
Total 206.701037    231 .894809682            
Number of obs =     232                                                                    R-squared     =  0.8491     
F(  6,   225) =  210.98                                                                        Adj R-squared =  0.8451 
Prob > F      =  0.0000                                                                       Root MSE      =  .37235  
LRGDPK Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
 
LGfcf .4903518 .0313799 15.63 0.000 .4285158    
 
.5521879 
LLab -.3869536 .0391313 -9.89 0.000 -.4640643    -.3098429 
Laid -.2972953 .0403554 -7.37 0.000 -.3768181   -.2177725 
Rol .1088395 .0748134 1.45 0.147 -.038585     .256264 
Coc .0632082 .0788827 0.80 0.424 -.092235     
.2186515 
LHukp .1698063 .0367778 4.62 0.000 .0973333    .2422793 
_cons 7.665361 .5322897 14.40 0.000 6.616451     
8.714272 
Table 3: Pair wise correlation test 
 Gfcf Lab Aid Rol Coc Hukp 
Gfcf 1.0000      
Lab 0.3611 1.0000     
Aid 0.1744 0.6055 1.0000    
Rol 0.1648 -0.2271 -0.0885 1.0000   
Coc 0.1837 -0.2665 -0.1140 0.8609 1.0000  
Hukp 0.1905 -0.1716 -0.1425 0.4351 0.3781 1.0000 
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Table 4: Fixed effect regression test 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       232 
Group variable: id                                     Number of groups   =        40 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5758                              Obs per group: min =         1 
between = 0.0006                                               avg =       5.8 
overall = 0.0004                                                  max =        12 
 F(6,186)           =     42.07 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3013                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
 
Lgfcf .0461522 .0206027 2.24 0.026 .0055071     
 
.0867972 
Llab .2119504 .1132885 1.87 0.063   -
.0115452      
.435446 
Laid -.0467392 .0177235 -2.64 0.009 -
.0817042             
-
.0117743 
 
Rol .1207702 .0458092 2.64 0.009 .0303977     .2111426 
Coc .0281721 .0334768 0.84 0.401 -.037871     .0942152 
Lhukp .1581069 .0242004 6.53 0.000 .1103643 .2058496 
_cons 2.81936 1.423865 1.98 0.049   
.0103595     
5.62836 
sigma_u .97836147      
sigma_e .08500866      
Rho .99250691      
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Table 5: Random Effect Test 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       232 
Group variable: id                                          Number of groups   =        40 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5305                                 Obs per group: min =         1 
between = 0.7007                                                                  avg =       5.8 
overall = 0.7544                                                                    max =        12 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =    285.11 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 Coeff. Std. err. T P>|t| [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
 
Lgfcf 0.1169852 .0196725 5.95 0.000 .0784279  
 
  
.1555425 
Llab -.2950377 0.0534192 -5.52 0.000 -
.3997374    
-
.1903381 
Laid -.0530724 .0197224 -2.69 0.007 -
.0917276    
-
.0144172 
Rol 0.1410111 .049217 2.87 0.004 .0445476    .2374747 
Coc -.0126988 .0361178 -0.35 0.725 -
.0834883    
.0580907 
Lhukp 0.2278372 .0205366 11.09 0.000 .1875863    .2680881 
_cons 8.957337 0.6743939 13.28 0.000   
7.635549     
10.27913 
sigma_u .39569066      
sigma_e .08500866      
Rho .95588169      
 
 Table 6: Hausman Test 
 Fixed(b) Randon(B) Difference(b-B) Sqrt [diag(v_b-
v_B] S.E 
Lgfcf 0.0461522 0.1169852 -0.0708331 0.006121 
Llab 0.2119504 -0.2950377 0.5069881 0.0999034 
Laid -0.0467392 -0.0530724 0.0063331 . 
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Rol 0.1207702 0.1410111 -0.020241 . 
Coc 0.0281721 -0.126988 0.0408709 . 
Lhukp 0.1581069 0.2278372 -0.0697302 0.0128028 
 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =   8.45                Prob>chi2 =      0.2070 
 
Table 7: System Generalized Method of Moment Test 
Number of obs= 215         Number of groups=40                 
Group variable: id Number of groups=40    obs per group: min=1 
Time variable: years          avg=5.375 
Number of instruments= 82                                          Max=11 
Wald chi2(7)          =  1.81e+06     Prob > chi2           =    0.0000  
Table 7: System dynamic panel data Test.   
Lrgdpk Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
 
Lrgdpk       
L1 1.025194 0.009429 108.73 0.000 1.006713 1.043674 
Lgfcf 0.0165695 0.0006299 26.30 0.000 0.0153348 0.0178041 
Llab 0.0009856 0.0075836 0.13 0.897 -0.013878 0.0158492 
Laid -0.005013 0.0028154 -1.78 0.075 -0.0105311 0.000505 
Rol 0.0728883 0.0024538 29.70 0.000 0.0680789 0.0776977 
Coc -0.0443613 0.0043732 -10.14 0.000 -0.0529326 -0.03579 
Lhukp -0.010289 0.0044708 -2.30 0.021 -0.0190516 -0.0015265 
_cons -0.3462577 0.1468183 -2.36 0.018 -0.6340164 -0.0584991 
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